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Inefficiencies in Local Infrastructure: Evidence from Drinking Water in California / Pierre Bodere, Giulia Brancaccio, Karam Kang.

NBER Working papers Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Bodere, Pierre.
Contributor:
Brancaccio, Giulia.
Kang, Karam.
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series:
Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w35690.
NBER working paper series no. w35690
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2026.
Summary:
Local elected officials oversee critical infrastructure, often with limited electoral accountability. This paper studies how this distorts investment across California drinking-water systems. We document that pollution responds to shifts in the political environment, motivating a dynamic model of public investment. We measure welfare returns to investment directly, combining event-study estimates of investment effectiveness and costs with those of residents' clean-water valuations, recovered from housing choices. Investment choices identify policymakers' responsiveness to those returns. Weak accountability diverts investment from high-return systems and conventional policies imperfectly offset these distortions: subsidy takeup is misaligned with returns, while uniform mandates induce welfare losses.
Notes:
August 2026.
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