Cybersecurity Risk Assessment and Experimental Validation of Automotive Ultrasonic Sensors Karlsruhe University of Applied Sciences

Format:

Book

Conference/Event

Author/Creator:

Gahm, Sebastian, author.

Haller, Jon, author.

Kriesten, Reiner, author.

Conference Name:

2026 Stuttgart International Symposium (2026-07-08 : Stuttgart, Germany)

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Risk assessments.

Cybersecurity.

Parking assistance.

Driving automation.

Sensors and actuators.

Local Subjects:

Risk assessments.

Cybersecurity.

Parking assistance.

Driving automation.

Sensors and actuators.

Physical Description:

1 online resource

Place of Publication:

Warrendale, PA SAE International 2026

Summary:

Ultrasonic sensors are widely deployed in automotive driver assistance systems for near-range environment perception and provide safety-relevant inputs for functions such as parking assistance and automated parking. With increasing vehicle automation, the integrity and availability of ultrasonic sensor data become more critical, as compromised measurements may lead to incorrect vehicle decisions and hazardous behavior. While prior research has extensively studied physical attacks on ultrasonic sensors, a structured cybersecurity risk analysis in accordance with automotive cybersecurity standards, combined with experimental validation, is largely missing. In particular, the communication interface between ultrasonic sensors and control units has received limited attention despite its relevance as a potential attack surface. This paper presents a systematic security analysis of an automotive ultrasonic sensing system based on a demonstrator setup. The work applies a Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment methodology aligned with ISO/SAE 21434 and HEAVENS 2.0 to identify security-relevant assets, threat scenarios, and attack paths. Risk levels are derived by evaluating potential impact and attack feasibility. To validate the risk assessment, a structured test strategy is developed using the ISTQB test process and translated into laboratory experiments. Both digital attacks targeting the sensor communication interface, with DSI3 selected as the representative protocol, and physical manipulations of the sensor environment are examined. Experimental results show that selected communication-level attacks can be realized with moderate effort and can cause controlled falsification or loss of measurement data. Physical environmental manipulations significantly degrade signal quality but do not fully suppress object detection in the evaluated configuration. The findings largely confirm the initial risk assessment while enabling refinement of attack feasibility parameters. The results provide a validated linkage between automotive cyber-security risk assessment methods and practical testing of ultrasonic sensing systems and underline the importance of jointly addressing communication interfaces and physical effects in future security concept development

Notes:

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