My Account Log in

2 options

How the taliban regained power in afghanistan / Mona Kanwal Sheikh.

DOAB Directory of Open Access Books Available online

View online

OAPEN Available online

View online
Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Sheikh, Mona Kanwal.
Mathiasen, Jan Werner, author.
Andersen, Lars Erslev, author.
Krause, Dino, author.
Wæver, Ole, 1960- author.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Taliban.
Afghanistan--Politics and government--2021-.
Afghanistan.
Physical Description:
1 online resource
Edition:
1st ed.
Place of Publication:
2026.
London : Routledge, 2026.
Summary:
This book examines how the Taliban were able to regain power in Afghanistan in 2021, some 20 years after the US intervention. The volume presents an analysis of the factors that contributed to the Taliban's ability to seize power following the withdrawal of the international coalition in August 2021, marking the end of 20 years of international engagement in the country. It is the result of a thorough review of research and policy publications over the course of 20 years, and is based on open-source data, including threat assessments of the Danish intelligence services. There are multiple explanations in academic and policy reports as to why the Taliban were able to take power despite the efforts expected to prevent this from happening. Based on existing research literature, analyses, studies and reports, the book identifies five factors that are central to understanding the outcome. These factors offer overarching explanations for why the Taliban were able to regain power, with each encompassing different clusters of challenges that constituted central conditions for the Taliban takeover. Although the book is not about assigning blame, the explanations provided here can contribute to further discussion about how to ensure the necessary knowledge base for future decisions when confronted with new emergencies calling for possible international intervention. This book will be of interest to students of security studies, conflict resolution, Asian security, military interventions, peace building, and International Relations.
Contents:
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
List of Figures and Tables
Acknowledgements
List of Abbreviations
Preface
1. Introduction
Why raise the question?
Method, sources and structure
Limitations
Brief summary of the explanatory chapters
2. The Taliban: Their Strength and Strategy
Introduction
Background: The history and ideological roots of the Taliban
The development of the Taliban 2001-21
Combat capability and armed attacks
Territorial control
Shadow governments
Explaining the strength of the Taliban
The Taliban were strategically adaptable
The Taliban and the Haqqani-network aligned
The Taliban exploited the central government's legitimacy issues
Conclusion
3. Negotiations with the Taliban
Background: Negotiations without, with and only with the Taliban
The American negotiations detached the Afghan government from the process
Direct dialogue between US and the Taliban
The government sidetracked
The Taliban declared themselves victors
Intra-Afghan initiatives and the struggle for ownership
Focus on conditions for withdrawal
The internal dialogue fell apart
Rejection of power sharing
The regional neighbours compete for the mediator role
Pakistan
Russia
Iran
China
4. The US War in Afghanistan
Background: 9/11 and the fear of terror
Knowledge base: Iraq, Afghanistan, al-Qaeda and the Taliban
The course of the war
Stabilisation lacking, legitimacy disappearing
Counterinsurgency or counterterrorism?
Shifting American strategies
Consequences of the early decisions
Enlarged enemy
Legitimacy issues
The Northern Alliance or Pashtun insurgent militias?
Dysfunctional state and lack of accountability for legitimate governance
Conclusion.
5. Military Capacity Building: The Main Problems
Background: Sustainability, ownership and coherence
Twenty years of military capacity building
2001-06: Counterterrorism within the framework of Operation Enduring freedom
2006-11: Counterinsurgency under the International Security Assistance Force
2011-21: Transition, exit strategy and the Resolute Support Mission
The greatest challenges facing the military capacity building
Short-term objectives prevented local anchoring and Afghan ownership
Capacity building supported NATO and US - not Afghanistan
Fragmented responsibility and inadequate coordination
6. Civilian Capacity Building: The Main Problems
Background: The ideas and actors behind the civilian effort
The international effort over 20 years
2001-05: Focus on the legitimacy of the Afghan central government
2006-11: Counterinsurgency sets the framework
2011-21: Institution building
Comprehensive approach to security and development
The main challenges in the civilian capacity building
The security situation restricted the development
The military directed the efforts
Too much money
Domestic objectives behind the initiatives
External dependency
7. Conclusion: What Can We Learn from the War in Afghanistan?
Why did the Taliban regain power?
Lessons learned - Five problem complexes
Knowledge disconnect
Fragmentation
Civil-military (im)balance
Peace in war
Legitimacy
Appendix: On Learning
Bibliography
Index.
Notes:
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
ISBN:
1-04-066542-X
1-04-056275-2
1-003-65294-8
9781003652946
1003652948
9781040562758
1040562752
OCLC:
1575179521
Publisher Number:
CIPO000314749

The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.

Find

Home Release notes

My Account

Shelf Request an item Bookmarks Fines and fees Settings

Guides

Using the Find catalog Using Articles+ Using your account