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How the taliban regained power in afghanistan / Mona Kanwal Sheikh.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Sheikh, Mona Kanwal.
- Mathiasen, Jan Werner, author.
- Andersen, Lars Erslev, author.
- Krause, Dino, author.
- Wæver, Ole, 1960- author.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Taliban.
- Afghanistan--Politics and government--2021-.
- Afghanistan.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource
- Edition:
- 1st ed.
- Place of Publication:
- 2026.
- London : Routledge, 2026.
- Summary:
- This book examines how the Taliban were able to regain power in Afghanistan in 2021, some 20 years after the US intervention. The volume presents an analysis of the factors that contributed to the Taliban's ability to seize power following the withdrawal of the international coalition in August 2021, marking the end of 20 years of international engagement in the country. It is the result of a thorough review of research and policy publications over the course of 20 years, and is based on open-source data, including threat assessments of the Danish intelligence services. There are multiple explanations in academic and policy reports as to why the Taliban were able to take power despite the efforts expected to prevent this from happening. Based on existing research literature, analyses, studies and reports, the book identifies five factors that are central to understanding the outcome. These factors offer overarching explanations for why the Taliban were able to regain power, with each encompassing different clusters of challenges that constituted central conditions for the Taliban takeover. Although the book is not about assigning blame, the explanations provided here can contribute to further discussion about how to ensure the necessary knowledge base for future decisions when confronted with new emergencies calling for possible international intervention. This book will be of interest to students of security studies, conflict resolution, Asian security, military interventions, peace building, and International Relations.
- Contents:
- Cover
- Half Title
- Title Page
- Copyright Page
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- Preface
- 1. Introduction
- Why raise the question?
- Method, sources and structure
- Limitations
- Brief summary of the explanatory chapters
- 2. The Taliban: Their Strength and Strategy
- Introduction
- Background: The history and ideological roots of the Taliban
- The development of the Taliban 2001-21
- Combat capability and armed attacks
- Territorial control
- Shadow governments
- Explaining the strength of the Taliban
- The Taliban were strategically adaptable
- The Taliban and the Haqqani-network aligned
- The Taliban exploited the central government's legitimacy issues
- Conclusion
- 3. Negotiations with the Taliban
- Background: Negotiations without, with and only with the Taliban
- The American negotiations detached the Afghan government from the process
- Direct dialogue between US and the Taliban
- The government sidetracked
- The Taliban declared themselves victors
- Intra-Afghan initiatives and the struggle for ownership
- Focus on conditions for withdrawal
- The internal dialogue fell apart
- Rejection of power sharing
- The regional neighbours compete for the mediator role
- Pakistan
- Russia
- Iran
- China
- 4. The US War in Afghanistan
- Background: 9/11 and the fear of terror
- Knowledge base: Iraq, Afghanistan, al-Qaeda and the Taliban
- The course of the war
- Stabilisation lacking, legitimacy disappearing
- Counterinsurgency or counterterrorism?
- Shifting American strategies
- Consequences of the early decisions
- Enlarged enemy
- Legitimacy issues
- The Northern Alliance or Pashtun insurgent militias?
- Dysfunctional state and lack of accountability for legitimate governance
- Conclusion.
- 5. Military Capacity Building: The Main Problems
- Background: Sustainability, ownership and coherence
- Twenty years of military capacity building
- 2001-06: Counterterrorism within the framework of Operation Enduring freedom
- 2006-11: Counterinsurgency under the International Security Assistance Force
- 2011-21: Transition, exit strategy and the Resolute Support Mission
- The greatest challenges facing the military capacity building
- Short-term objectives prevented local anchoring and Afghan ownership
- Capacity building supported NATO and US - not Afghanistan
- Fragmented responsibility and inadequate coordination
- 6. Civilian Capacity Building: The Main Problems
- Background: The ideas and actors behind the civilian effort
- The international effort over 20 years
- 2001-05: Focus on the legitimacy of the Afghan central government
- 2006-11: Counterinsurgency sets the framework
- 2011-21: Institution building
- Comprehensive approach to security and development
- The main challenges in the civilian capacity building
- The security situation restricted the development
- The military directed the efforts
- Too much money
- Domestic objectives behind the initiatives
- External dependency
- 7. Conclusion: What Can We Learn from the War in Afghanistan?
- Why did the Taliban regain power?
- Lessons learned - Five problem complexes
- Knowledge disconnect
- Fragmentation
- Civil-military (im)balance
- Peace in war
- Legitimacy
- Appendix: On Learning
- Bibliography
- Index.
- Notes:
- Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
- ISBN:
- 1-04-066542-X
- 1-04-056275-2
- 1-003-65294-8
- 9781003652946
- 1003652948
- 9781040562758
- 1040562752
- OCLC:
- 1575179521
- Publisher Number:
- CIPO000314749
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