Social Choice and Public Reason : On the Possibility of Agreement and Justification in Open Societies.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Hédoin, Cyril.

Series:

Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Series

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource (354 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

New York : Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2026.

Summary:

Social Choice and Public Reason studies how liberal societies, characterized by moral diversity and pluralism, are able to justify to all their members the rules that make social and political life possible. The challenge lies in the fact that individuals are likely to disagree about what rules should be followed. That means that very often individuals will be forced to abide by rules that they reject. The book addresses this problem by inquiring into the sources of disagreement and how they can be overcome by appropriate social organization and political institutions.

Contents:

Cover

Half Title

Series

Title Page

Copyright Page

Dedication

Contents

Series Editors' Foreword

Preface

1 Introduction

1.1 Values and Agreement in Social Choice Theory

1.2 Welfarism and the Social Choice Model of Normative Analysis

1.3 Beyond Welfarism: Social Choice, Public Reason, and the Open Society

1.4 Outline of the Book

Part I The Public Reason Model of Social Choice

2 Public Reasons and Persons

2.1 The Neo-Samuelsonian Account of Economic Agency

2.1.1 Rationality and Contemporary Revealed Preference Theory in Economics

2.1.2 Ross's Neo-Samuelsonian Account of Economic Agency

2.1.3 Neo-Samuelsonian Welfare Economics

2.1.4 Social Choice Without Persons

2.2 Axiological Rationality and Primary Normative Agents

2.2.1 The Rationality Condition for Agency

2.2.2 The Concept of (Primary) Normative Agents

2.2.3 Reasons, Values, and Axiological Rationality

2.2.4 The Personal Point of View and Personal Conceptions of the Good

2.3 Personhood and the Public Point of View

2.3.1 Primary Normative Agency and the Public Point of View

2.3.2 The Public Point of View as a Choice Situation

2.3.3 Practical Reasoning from the Public Point of View

2.3.4 Personhood as a Form of Life

3 Social Choice, Social Contract Theory, and Public Reason

3.1 The Social Contract as a Normative Model of Rational Justification

3.1.1 The Many Varieties of Social Contracts

3.1.2 Modeling the Social Contract

3.1.3 Three Problems of Justification

3.2 Two Theories of Social Choice

3.2.1 "Political" Social Choice

3.2.2 "Normative" Social Choice

3.2.3 Consensus and Similarity of Social Evaluations

3.3 The Public Reason Model of Social Choice

3.3.1 The Idea of Public Reason: Rawls Versus Gaus

3.3.2 Combining the Social Contract and the Social Choice Models.

3.3.3 Public Reason and the Ideal Two-Tier Model of Democracy

4 Consent and Social Choice

4.1 First-Person Constructivism and the Public Point of View

4.1.1 A Formalization of the Public Point of View

4.1.2 The Public Point of View as a First-Person Procedure of Construction

4.1.3 The Public Point of View as an Archimedean Point

4.2 The Hypothetical Consent Principle

4.2.1 Reasoning from the Public Point of View

4.2.2 A Formulation of the Hypothetical Consent Principle

4.2.3 Hypothetical Consent and Respect for Persons

4.3 Justified Social States and the Publicly Admissible Set of Social Orderings

4.3.1 Justified Social States

4.3.2 Publicly Admissible Set of Social Orderings

5 Unanimity, Rights, and Respect for Persons

5.1 The Default Claim Revisited

5.1.1 Are "Laundered" Conceptions of the Good Possible?

5.1.2 The Default Claim and the Rights of Agency

5.2 Respect for Persons and the Two Ideals of Individual Sovereignty

5.2.1 Unanimity and the Pareto Principle

5.2.2 The Justification of Jurisdictional Rights

5.3 Dealing with the Incompatibility of Unanimity and Rights

5.3.1 The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal

5.3.2 Escaping the Impossibility

Part II The Rules of Social Morality

6 Naturalism and Moral Conventionalism

6.1 Moral Rules: Their Nature and Why We Need Them

6.1.1 Moral Rules and the Public Reason Model

6.1.2 The Functions of Moral Rules

6.1.3 The Moral/Conventional Distinction

6.2 Moral Conventionalism as Naturalism

6.2.1 Conventions: Coordination, Constitutive, and Deep

6.2.2 Are There Non-Arbitrary Conventions?

6.2.3 The Possibility of Moral Conventions

6.3 Two Objections: Skepticism and Relativism

6.3.1 Responding to the Moral Skeptic

6.3.2 Responding to the Moral Relativist

7 Rule-Following and Moral Conventions.

7.1 Institutions, Rule-Following, and Game Theory

7.1.1 The Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium Account of Institutions

7.1.2 Institutions as Rule-Governed Games

7.1.3 Common Understanding and Community-Based Salience

7.2 Genuinely Moral Conventions

7.2.1 Public Justification and Moral Conventions

7.2.2 A Formal Characterization

7.3 A Special Case: Conventions of Personhood

7.3.1 Conventions of Personhood: Moral and Deep

7.3.2 The Relativist Objection Again

8 Social Morality and Forms of Strategic Reasoning

8.1 Rule-Following and Best-Reply Reasoning

8.1.1 Best-Reply Reasoning and Bayesian Rationality

8.1.2 Kindness, Resentment, and Conditional Preference for Conformity

8.1.3 Best-Reply Reasoning and Deontic Constraints

8.2 Team Reasoning and Public Reasoning in Games

8.2.1 Theories of Team Reasoning

8.2.2 Public Reasoning in Games

8.3 The Dualism of Practical Reason Revisited

Part III The Many Shades of Moral Disagreement

9 Tentative Disagreement and the Public Point of View

9.1 An Agreement Theorem

9.1.1 Characterizing Tentative Disagreement

9.1.2 Aumann's Agreement Theorem or the Impossibility to "Agree to Disagree"

9.1.3 An Agreement Theorem for the Public Reason Model

9.2 Social Morality and Deliberation as Bases for Agreement

9.2.1 Social Morality and the Common Prior Assumption

9.2.2 Deliberation as Information Sharing

9.3 Reconsidering the Consensus Versus Convergence Debate in Public Reason Liberalism

9.3.1 The Consensus Versus Convergence Debate

9.3.2 Consensus and Convergence in the Public Reason Model

10 Social Choice and Perspectival Disagreement

10.1 Perspectival Disagreement and the Diversity of Perspectives

10.1.1 The Concept of Perspective

10.1.2 Formalizing Perspectival Diversity

10.1.3 The Costs and Benefits of Perspectival Diversity.

10.2 Managing Perspectival Disagreement: The Rights Approach

10.2.1 Jurisdictional Rights and Perspectival Diversity

10.2.2 The Problem of "Moral Externalities"

10.3 Managing Perspectival Disagreement: The Bargaining Approach

10.3.1 Bargaining About Rights Under Perspectival Diversity

10.3.2 Bargaining About Rights and Public Justification

11 Minimal Morality and Disagreement About Personhood

11.1 Minimal Morality and Multilevel Social Contract Theory

11.1.1 Deep Moral Pluralism and Two-Level Social Contract Theory

11.1.2 Instrumental Rationality and Minimal Morality

11.2 Fundamental Disagreement About Personhood and Deep Moral Pluralism

11.2.1 What Does It Mean to Disagree About Personhood

11.2.2 Disagreement About Personhood as Cases of Conflict

11.3 Public Reason and Minimal Political Morality

11.3.1 Two Objections to a Hobbesian Account of Minimal Morality

11.3.2 Public Reason and Hobbesian Political Morality

11.3.3 Personhood and Legitimate Political Social Choice

Part IV The Political Morality of the Open Society

12 The Sectarian Conundrum of the Open Society

12.1 The Open Society and Its "Paradoxes"

12.1.1 The "Paradox of Tolerance" and Other Paradoxes of Liberal Societies

12.1.2 Stating the Sectarian Conundrum

12.1.3 Why the Sectarian Conundrum Is Neither About Tolerance Nor a Paradox

12.2 Is Public Reason Sectarian?

12.2.1 The Sectarianism of Rawlsian Public Reason Liberalism

12.2.2 Sectarianism and the Convergence Account of Public Reason

12.2.3 Sectarianism Does Not Imply Authoritarianism

12.3 The Basis for Reconciliation

13 The Governance of the Open Society: Knowledge and Polycentricity

13.1 The Ideal Two-Tier Social Choice Model of Politics

13.1.1 Reintroducing the Normative/Political Distinction of Social Choice Theory.

13.1.2 Legitimacy and Democratic Decision Rules

13.1.3 Social Preferences over Political Decision Rules

13.2 Choosing Political Decision Rules: Populism Versus Elitism

13.2.1 Democracy and the Use of (Non) Public Reasons

13.2.2 Populism Against Elitism

13.3 Governing the Open Society: The Case for Polycentricity

13.3.1 Polycentricity as a Phenomenon and Paradigm

13.3.2 The Polycentric Public Reason Model

13.3.3 The Virtues of Polycentricity

Concluding Remarks

List of Concepts and Principles

Aumann's Agreement Theorem

Authority Claim

Axiological Rationality

Bacharach's Team Reasoning Decision Protocol

Cases of Conflict in the Public Reason Model

Consent Principle

Consistency of Authority Claims

Consistency of Authority Claims (Extended)

Domains of Sovereignty

Genuinely Moral Conventions

Hypothetical Consent Principle

-i-constant states

Ideal of Democratic Citizenship

Impersonal Welfarism

Jurisdictional Rights

Jurisdictional Rights with Limited Perspectival Diversity

Justified Social State I: Non-Dominated States

Justified Social States II: Non-Inferiority

Lewis-Conventions

Maximal Public Inclusiveness

Moral Conventionalism

Normative Agency Does Not Imply Personhood

Normative Agency

Personal Point of View

Personhood

Primary Normative Agency

Public Justification and Respect for Persons

Public Point of View-Choice Situation

Public Point of View-Practical Reasoning

Public Reason Model of Social Choice

Public Reasoning in Games

Publicly Admissible Set of Social Orderings

R*-Inferiority

Rationality Assumption (Behaviorist Version)

Rationality Assumption (Maximization Version)

Rationality Assumption (Consistency Version)

Rationality Condition for Agency

Reciprocity of Authority Claims.

Reciprocity of Authority Claims (Extended).

Notes:

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

ISBN:

9780197852033

OCLC:

1588782535