Handbook of the Economics of Matching / editors, Yeon-Koo Che, Pierre A. Chiappori, and Bernard Salanié.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Che, Yeon-Koo, author.

Contributor:

Che, Yeon-Koo, editor.

Chiappori, Pierre A., editor.

Salanié, Bernard, editor.

Series:

Handbooks in economics ; Volume 1.

Handbooks in Economics Series ; Volume 1

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Matching theory.

Statistical matching.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (357 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Amsterdam, Netherlands : North-Holland, an imprint of Elsevier, [2024]

Summary:

This first volume of the Handbook of the Economics of Matching summarizes both classic results and the many recent advances on matching with transfers.Its five chapters, written by leading researchers,cover both theoretical and empirical work.- Provides up-to-date reviews from leading economists on matching markets- Covers both economic theory.

Contents:

Front Cover

Handbook of the Economics of Matching

Copyright

List of Contributors

Preface

References

Chapter 1: Frictionless one-to-one matching with transfers: Theory

1 Introduction

2 Introductory example

2.1 How should they be matched?

2.2 How will they be matched?

2.3 Multidimensional matching

2.4 Extension: arbitrary number of agents

3 Mathematical framework: the one-dimensional case

3.1 Some notations

3.2 Optimization

3.3 The main theorem

3.4 The case of absolutely continuous distributions

3.5 Supermodularity with unidimensional types

3.5.1 Definition

3.5.2 The main result

3.5.3 Who remains unmatched?

3.6 Recovering intrapair allocation

3.6.1 The duality approach

3.6.2 A more direct path

3.6.3 Pinning down the constant

3.7 Applications

3.7.1 An illustrative example: marriage market matching

3.7.2 Applications in the literature

3.8 'Roommate' matching

4 Mathematical framework: the multidimensional case

4.1 Index models

4.2 The general multidimensional case

4.3 Recovering intrapair allocation

4.3.1 Index models

4.3.2 Non-index models

4.4 Randomization

4.5 Matching on human and reproductive capital

5 Conclusion and discussion

Chapter 2: Matching with transfers: Applications

1.1 The costs and benefits of TU

1.2 Taking the theory to the data

1.3 Identifying the parameters

1.4 Roadmap

2 Separable models

2.1 The one-to-one bipartite model

2.2 The stable matchings

2.3 The data

2.4 Separability

2.5 Identification

2.6 The limits of identification

2.7 The logit model

2.8 Comparative statics

2.9 Interpreting matching patterns

3 Computation and inference in separable models

3.1 Computing the stable matching

3.2 Estimating separable models.

3.2.1 Maximum likelihood estimation

3.2.2 Minimum distance estimation

3.2.3 Estimating the logit model

4 Extensions of separable models

4.1 Matches only

4.2 Dynamic matching

4.3 Unipartite matching

4.4 Beyond one-to-one matching

4.5 Continuous observables

5 Applications of separable models

5.1 A caveat

6 Non-separable models

7 Matching with frictions

7.1 Identification

7.2 Applications

8 Concluding remarks

Appendix A Some convex analysis

Appendix B Finite markets

Appendix C Some generalized entropies

C.1 The Choo and Siow model with heteroskedasticity

C.1.1 Nested logit

C.1.2 Mixed logit

Chapter 3: Matching under imperfectly transferable utility

1.1 Motivating remarks

1.2 Setting and notations

1.3 A bestiary of models

2 Pairwise bargaining sets

2.1 The Pareto efficiency approach vs. the Pareto weights approach

2.2 Properties of feasible sets

2.3 Distance-to-frontier function

2.4 Examples

2.4.1 Transferable utility models

2.4.2 Non-transferable utility models

2.4.3 Linearly transferable utility models

2.4.4 Exponentially transferable utility models

2.4.5 Revisiting example 2

2.4.6 Revisiting example 4

2.4.7 Matching with uncertainty

3 Stable matchings without heterogeneity

3.1 Setting

3.2 Stability

4 Stable matchings with heterogeneity

4.1 Unobserved heterogeneity

4.2 Another parameterization of bargaining sets

4.3 Aggregate equilibrium

4.4 Existence, uniqueness and computation

5 The ITU-logit model

5.1 Matching functions

5.2 Examples

5.3 Matching function equilibrium

6 Estimation

7 Remarks and discussions

7.1 Positive assortative matching

7.2 Aggregate matching equilibrium beyond the logit case

7.3 Comparative statics

7.4 Equilibrium vs optimality.

7.5 Case without unobserved heterogeneity

7.6 Normative properties of equilibrium

7.6.1 Equal treatment

7.6.2 Pareto efficiency

7.7 One-to-many models

7.8 Full assignment

7.9 Non-transferable utility

7.10 Search-and-matching

8 Related literature

Chapter 4: Investment and competitive matching

2 An illustrative example

2.1 A planner

2.2 Complete contracting: ex-ante equilibrium

2.3 Incomplete contracting: ex-post equilibrium

2.4 Plan of the chapter

3 The model

3.1 Agents and investments

3.2 Special cases

3.3 Assignments

3.4 Outcomes

3.5 Transferable utility

3.5.2 Utility frontiers

3.6 Nontransferable utility

3.7 Modeling issues

3.8 Relationship to the literature

4 Ex-ante equilibrium with transferable utility

4.1 Definition

4.2 Existence of ex-ante equilibria

4.3 Efficiency of ex-ante equilibria

4.4 (Generalized) Hedonic equilibria

4.5 Ex-ante equilibrium behavior

4.5.1 Full matching

4.5.2 Positive assortative matching

4.5.3 Uniqueness

5 Ex-post equilibrium with transferable utility

5.1 Definition

5.2 How are ex-ante and ex-post equilibrium related?

5.2.1 Ex-ante equilibria are ex-post equilibria

5.2.2 Other ex-post equilibria

5.3 Coordination failures in ex-post equilibria

5.3.1 Coordination failures

5.3.2 (Generalized) Hedonic equilibria

5.3.3 Are coordination failures relevant?

5.4 Investments "in the market"

5.4.1 Ex-post equilibria with separable preferences

5.4.2 Observational ex-ante equilibrium

5.5 Properties of ex-post equilibria

5.5.1 Full matching

5.5.2 Mismatch

5.5.3 Investment efficiency

5.5.4 Ex-ante versus ex-post: irreconcilable differences

5.5.5 Efficient ex-post equilibria

5.6 Backward induction

6 Nontransferable utility.

6.1 Equilibria

6.1.1 Ex-ante equilibria

6.1.2 Ex-post equilibria

6.2 Existence of equilibrium

6.3 Examples

6.3.1 Ex-ante prices

6.3.2 Premarital investments

6.3.3 Transplants and implants

6.3.4 One-sided investments

6.4 Investment Inefficiency in ex-post equilibria

6.5 Discussion

6.5.1 Definition of equilibrium

6.5.2 Why is utility nontransferable?

7 Discussion

7.1 Recap

7.2 Other directions

7.2.1 Competition

7.2.2 Stochastic investments

7.2.3 Search frictions and bargaining

7.2.4 Investments as signals

Appendix A Appendix

A.1 Example, Section 5.4.1

A.2 Example, Section 5.4.2

A.3 Proof of Proposition 20

A.4 Example, Section 5.5.4

A.5 Example, Section 5.5.4

A.6 Example, Section 5.5.5

A.7 Example, Section 5.5.5

A.8 Proof of Proposition 22

A.9 Proof of Lemma 4

A.10 Proof of Strict Single Crossing, Section 6.3.2

A.11 Proof of Strict Single Crossing, Section 6.3.3

A.12 Example, Section 6.3.4

Chapter 5: Matching with incomplete information

1.1 Reduced-form solution concepts

1.2 Incomplete information

1.3 Overview

2 Canonical matching models with incomplete information

3 A prior-free approach

3.1 An example

3.2 Iterative stability

3.3 The implications of LMPS stability

3.4 Competitive market

3.5 Extensions

4 A Bayesian approach

4.1 Example

4.2 Bayesian stability

4.3 Weak and strong consistencies

4.4 Implications of stability and consistency

4.5 Competitive equilibrium

4.6 Stable beliefs: whither the models with priors

5 The preference revelation game approach

6 Open questions and further research

6.1 Applications

6.2 Other solution concepts

6.3 Epistemic foundations

6.4 Implementation

6.5 Search, matching, and dynamic games.

6.6 Information design, acquisition, and communication in matching

Back Cover.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Description based on print version record.

Other Format:

Print version:

ISBN:

9780443314667

0443314675

OCLC:

1481791347