Handbook of the Economics of Conflict.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Morelli, Massimo, author.

Contributor:

Ray, Debraj.

Sjöström, Tomas.

Dube, Oeindrila.

Series:

Handbooks in Economics Series

Handbooks in Economics Series ; v.Volume 1

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Ecological assessment (Biology).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (0 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Chantilly : Elsevier Science & Technology, 2024.

Summary:

This volume is a comprehensive exploration of the intersection between economics and conflict, bringing together contributions from leading scholars. The book delves into the causes, dynamics, and consequences of conflicts, offering theoretical frameworks, empirical evidence, and policy insights. Topics covered include the economic roots and outcomes of war, mistrust and imperfect information in conflict dynamics, the role of social divisions and identity, the impact of climate change on conflict, and the influence of natural resources and trade. The work emphasizes the interplay between economic systems, institutional frameworks, and societal divisions, aiming to provide a nuanced understanding of conflict economics. It is intended for academics, policymakers, and researchers interested in economics, political science, and conflict studies. Generated by AI.

Contents:

Front Cover

Handbook of the Economics of Conflict

Copyright

Contents

List of Contributors

Introduction

References

Chpter 1: Causes of war

1 Introduction

2 Baseline model

3 Bargaining and commitment with complete information

3.1 Bargaining and war

3.1.1 Large first-mover advantages and strategic complements

4 Coordination with incomplete information

4.1 Bargaining and uniqueness

4.2 The Hobbesian trap

4.2.1 Hobbesian model with signaling

4.2.2 Hobbesian model with cheap talk

4.2.3 Hobbesian model with binding agreements

5 Mechanism design

5.1 Private information about the cost of war

5.1.1 Ultimatum bargaining

5.1.2 Optimal screening

5.1.3 Mechanisms for peace

5.2 Private information about military power

5.2.1 One-sided private information

5.2.2 Two-sided private information

6 Commitment problems and power shifts

6.1 Power and time: the Thucydides trap

6.1.1 Two-period model

6.1.2 Infinite horizon model

6.1.3 Commitment problems in intrastate conflicts

6.2 Power and resources: Chamberlain's trap

6.2.1 Self-enforcing allocations

6.2.2 Short-term commitments: the continuous case

6.2.3 Short-term commitments: the discontinuous case

6.3 Deterrence

7 Other issues

7.1 Guns or butter?

7.2 Is democracy good for peace?

7.3 How long will war last?

8 Conclusion

Chpter 2: Mistrust, misperception, and misunderstanding: Imperfect information and conflict dynamics

2 Fear and misperception in international relations

3 Misperception and mistrust in the security dilemma

3.1 The security dilemma

3.2 Empirical determinants of mistrust, misperception, and offense-defense balance

3.3 Analyzing the simultaneous security dilemma

3.4 Analyzing the sequential security dilemma.

4 Misperceptions and conflict dynamics

4.1 Public misperceptions lead to eventual cooperation

4.2 Private misperceptions lead to conflict traps

4.3 Limited memory leads to conflict cycles

4.4 Additional applications

5 Misperceptions and deterrence

5.1 Analysis of the basic deterrence game

5.2 Multiple possible attackers and imperfect attribution

5.3 Continuous claims and salami tactics

5.4 Dynamic deterrence with misperceptions

6 Conclusion

Appendix A Omitted proofs

A.1 Proof of proposition 2

A.2 Proof of proposition 3

A.3 Proof of proposition 4

Chpter 3: Conflict in economic history

2 Causes

2.1 Causes in the cross section

2.1.1 Biology

2.1.2 Geography

2.1.3 Diversity

2.1.4 Culture

2.1.5 Persistence

2.2 Causes in the panel

2.2.1 Negative economic shocks

2.2.2 Positive economic shocks

2.2.3 Trade

2.2.4 Institutions

2.2.5 Military technology

2.2.6 Future directions

3 Consequences

3.1 Economic consequences

3.2 Culture and institutions

3.3 Summary: Europe's exceptional escape

4 Conclusion

Chpter 4: Social divisions and conflict

2 Measuring social divisions

2.1 Inequality measurement

2.1.1 Income inequality: the Gini coefficient

2.1.2 Ethnic divisions: the Greenberg-Gini and the fractionalization indices

2.1.3 Income equality and ethnic divisions: vertical vs. horizontal inequality

2.2 Polarization

2.2.1 Polarization and ethnic divisions

3 Income inequality and conflict

3.1 Theoretical predictions

3.2 Empirical evidence

3.3 Takeaways

4 Ethnic divisions and conflict

4.1 Fractionalization, polarization and social conflict

4.2 Ethnic divisions and conflict: theory and empirics

4.3 Takeaways

5 Ethnicity, income inequality and conflict.

5.1 Between group inequality and conflict onset

5.2 Within-group inequality and conflict intensity

5.3 Group-level income inequality and conflict: a summary

6 Concluding remarks

Chpter 5: Identities in conflict

2 From economics to identity: conceptual issues

2.1 Some general remarks

2.2 From environments to the salience of identities

2.3 Cultural salience and stereotyping

2.4 Cultural salience and aspirations

2.5 Ethnic salience and resource-grabbing

2.5.1 Identity conflict as a consolation prize

2.5.2 Class and identity

2.5.3 Peace or conflict?

2.5.4 Analysis

2.6 Group-based inequalities and horizontal inequality

2.7 More on the salience of identity-based conflicts

3 From economics to identity: empirical studies

3.1 A nonlinear relationship between inequality and open conflict

3.2 The dimensions of conflict

3.2.1 Direct effects

3.2.2 Cross effects: from economics to identity

3.3 Horizontal inequality and resource grabbing

4 Concluding remarks

Chpter 6: New evidence on the economics of climate and conflict

2 New meta-analysis results

3 Lessons for analysis across spatial and temporal scales

4 Recent contributions with a focus on mechanisms linking climate and conflict

4.1 Overview of literature on mechanisms

4.2 Empirical approaches to understanding mechanisms

4.3 Key lessons on channels

5 Discussion

Acknowledgments

Chapter 7: Natural resources and conflict: The crucial role of power mismatch and geographic asymmetries

2 Theory

3 Empirical evidence

3.1 Resource abundance and civil war

3.2 Capital intensity of natural commodity production

3.3 Grievances of the local population

3.4 Third-party intervention and strategic territory.

3.5 Resource asymmetry and mismatch

4 Policy

4.1 Overview

4.2 International coordination

4.3 Human capital accumulation and labor market policies

4.4 Smart green transition

4.5 Power-sharing and democratization

5 Conclusion

Chapter 8: Trade in the shadow of war: A quantitative toolkit for geoeconomics

2 Historical perspective

3 Trade and war: theory

3.1 The standard argument on trade dependence and its pitfall

3.1.1 Evidence on aggregate trade

3.1.2 Firm-level data

3.1.3 A quantitative puzzle: the contribution of trade disruption to OCW

3.2 A quantitative model of trade and war

3.2.1 Setup

3.2.1.1 Preferences

3.2.2 A game of diplomatic negotiation

3.2.2.1 Modeling diplomacy

3.2.2.2 Solving the game

3.2.2.3 Geoeconomic factors

3.2.3 Trade equilibrium

3.3 Computing OCWs

3.3.1 War damages

3.3.2 Exact hat algebra

3.4 Geography of import sourcing (GIS)

3.4.1 First-order approximation

3.4.2 GIS and high-intensity symmetrical warfare

3.4.3 The case of low-intensity asymmetrical warfare

3.5 Quantification of geoeconomic factors

3.5.1 Calibration of the parameters

3.5.2 Results

3.5.3 Time-evolution of geoeconomic factors

3.6 Additional mechanisms

3.6.1 Trade diplomacy

3.6.2 Globalization, values and tolerance

3.6.3 Vested interests

3.7 Trade and the intensity of conflict

4 Survey of the empirical literature

4.1 Bringing the model to the data

4.1.1 Data

4.1.2 Econometric equation

4.1.3 Estimation challenges

4.2 GIS and war: estimation results

4.3 GIS and the costs of conflict containment

4.4 Evidence on trade diplomacy

4.5 Micro-level evidence on trade and war

5 Trade policy in the shadow of war

5.1 Geoeconomic welfare gains: theory.

5.2 Geoeconomic welfare gains: numerical procedure

5.3 Geoeconomic welfare gains: application

5.3.1 Back to autarky

5.3.2 EU enlargement to Ukraine

5.4 The security dilemma in the data

5.4.1 Political acceptability

5.4.2 A role for the multilateral approach to trade agreements

5.5 Trade sanctions

Appendix A Derivation of Equation (25)

Appendix B Approximated procedure: derivation of Equation (27)

Chapter 9: Militarization, negotiations, and conflict

2 Basics of strategic arming

3 Public arming

3.1 Public arming with bargaining

3.2 Costly peace

3.3 Secret arming followed by bargaining

4 Two-sided arming

4.1 Simultaneous public arming with bargaining

4.2 Simultaneous hidden arming with bargaining

5 Signaling by arming

5.1 Robustness of the signaling result

6 Preventive attack of a state that can arm

6.1 Commitment

6.2 Infinite-horizon model

7 Conclusion

Back Cover.

Notes:

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Part of the metadata in this record was created by AI, based on the text of the resource.

ISBN:

9780323988926

032398892X

OCLC:

1478692180