Handbook of commercial policy. Volume 1B / edited by Kyle Bagwell, Robert W. Staiger.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Bagwell, Kyle, editor.

Satiger, Robert W., editor.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Commercial policy--Handbooks, manuals, etc.

Commercial policy.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (600 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Amsterdam : North-Holland is an imprint of Elsevier, [2016]

Summary:

Handbook of Commercial Policy explores three main topics that permeate the study of commercial policy.The first section presents a broad set of basic empirical facts regarding the pattern and evolution of commercial policy, with the second section investigating the crosscutting legal issues relating to the purpose and design of agreements.

Contents:

Front Cover

Handbook of Commercial Policy

Copyright

Introduction to the Series

Contents

Preface

Contributors

Trade Agreements: Issue Areas

Chapter 1: Enforcement and Dispute Settlement

1. Introduction

1.1. Basic Questions

1.2. Institutional Background: A Minimal Sketch

2. A Simple Model of Trade

2.1. Basic Setup

2.2. Government Objective Functions and Policy Choices

2.2.1. Political Economy Influences

2.2.2. Economic Uncertainties and Concealed Trade Barriers

3. Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement

3.1. A Basic Analytical Framework: Perfect Public Equilibrium

3.2. Informational Issues

3.2.1. Incomplete Information

3.2.1.1. Efficient Agreements with Transfers

3.2.1.2. Costly Transfers and Dispute Settlement Procedures

3.2.1.3. A Discussion

3.2.2. Imperfect Information

3.2.2.1. A Brief Review of the Literature Using Public Trigger Strategies

3.2.2.2. Private Trigger Strategies and Dispute Settlement Procedures

3.3. Asymmetry and Multilateral Aspects

3.3.1. Bilateral Imbalances of Power and a Multilateral Punishment Mechanism

3.3.2. Asymmetric Countries and Alternative Punishment Mechanisms

3.4. Renegotiation

4. Incomplete Contract and Dispute Settlement

4.1. Incomplete Information and Tariff Caps

4.2. Contracting Costs and Role of Dispute Settlement Body

4.3. Costly Transfers, Renegotiation, and Dispute Settlement

4.3.1. A Discussion

5. Empirical Studies

5.1. Evidence for Self-Enforcing Policy Coordinations

5.2. Empirical Studies on GATT/WTO Trade Disputes

5.2.1. Some Facts Regarding WTO Dispute Settlement Cases

5.2.2. Selection Issues Associated with GATT/WTO Disputes

5.2.3. Determinants of Dispute Outcomes

5.2.3.1. Early Settlement

5.2.3.2. Trade Volume Outcomes.

5.2.4. Disputes Over MFN and non-MFN Policies

6. Concluding Remarks

Acknowledgments

References

Chapter 2: The Escape Clause in Trade Agreements

2. The Escape Clause in Existing Trade Agreements

2.1. The GATT Escape Clause (Article XIX)

2.2. The WTO Agreement on Safeguards

2.3. Other Escape Clauses

3. The Motivation for Escape Clauses

3.1. Arguments Based on Economic Efficiency

3.2. The Role of the Escape Clause in Self-Enforcement of Agreements

3.3. Political Economy Arguments

4. Escape Clauses and Optimal Contracts

4.1. Self-Enforcing Agreements

4.2. Political Economy Models

4.2.1. Remedies for Escape

4.2.2. Tariff Bindings and the Escape Clause

4.2.3. Costly Verification and the Escape Clause

4.2.4. Costly Contracting and the Escape Clause

5. Other Flexibility Mechanisms

6. Does the Escape Clause Undermine or Promote Trade Liberalization?

7. Empirical Analysis

7.1. Macroeconomic Shocks and Safeguards

7.2. Economic Impact

8. Conclusions

Chapter 3: Dumping and Antidumping Duties

2. A Brief Primer on the History of AD Laws and Basics on Implementation

2.1. History of AD Laws

2.2. Implementation of AD Laws

2.2.1. Dumping Margin Determination

2.2.2. Injury Determination

3. Facts and Figures on AD Use

4. Key Issues Traditionally Addressed in the Economics and Law Literature

4.1. When and Why Does Dumping Occur?

4.1.1. Market Structure Explanations

4.1.2. Dumping Induced by AD Laws

4.1.3. Antidumping When There is No Dumping

4.2. When and Where Do AD Actions and Duties Occur?

4.2.1. Cross-Industry Incidence

4.2.2. Cross-Country Incidence

4.3. How Effective Are AD Actions?

4.3.1. Direct Effects

4.3.2. Indirect and/or Unintended Consequences.

4.4. How Do Administrative, Legal, and Regulatory Processes Affect AD Laws and Their Consequences?

5. Recent Research Developments

5.1. Measuring the Myriad Effects of AD Duties on Trade

5.1.1. Does AD Distort Trade in Third Markets?

5.1.2. What Are the Firm- and Plant-level Impacts of AD Duties?

5.1.3. Does Antidumping Have a Chilling Effect on Trade Beyond the Targeted Products?

5.1.4. Does Antidumping Result in Exit?

5.2. Does Antidumping Matter for Developing Countries?

5.3. Is AD Used Strategically at the Country Level?

5.4. Trade Agreements, the WTO, and AD

5.4.1. Do PTAs Affect the Patterns of AD Use?

5.4.2. Has Mandatory Sunset Worked?

5.4.3. Is the WTO Constraining the Use of AD?

5.5. AD's Role in Maintaining Trade Cooperation

6. Concluding Comments

Chapter 4: Subsidies and Countervailing Duties

2. Domestic Subsidies and Shallow Integration

2.1. The Basic Partial-Equilibrium Model with Domestic Subsidies

2.2. Domestic Subsidies in General Equilibrium

2.2.1. Shallow Integration with Domestic Standards

2.2.2. Shallow Integration with Domestic Subsidies

3. Domestic Subsidies and Deep Integration

3.1. Private Information and Domestic Subsidies

3.1.1. Costly Domestic Efficiency

3.1.2. Restriction on Domestic Efficiency

3.2. Commitment and Domestic Subsidies

3.3. Offshoring and Deep Integration

3.3.1. The Basic offshoring Model

3.3.2. Domestic Distortion in Nash Policies

3.4. More Rationales for Deep Integration

3.5. Further Discussions

4. Prohibition of Export Subsidies

4.1. Firm-Delocation/Profit-Shifting Externality

4.2. Commitment Theory

4.3. Countervailing Measures

5. Conclusions

Chapter 5: Nontariff Measures and the World Trading System☆.

1. Introduction

2. NTMs: Definitions, Data, and Trade Effects

2.1. Defining NTMs

2.2. The Landscape of NTMs

2.2.1. Key Sources of NTMs Data

2.2.2. Some Stylized Facts on NTMs

2.3. The Trade Impact of NTMs

2.3.1. Methodology

2.3.2. NTM Trade Restrictiveness: Specific Measures

2.3.3. NTM Trade Restrictiveness: Aggregate Measures

3. Treatment of NTMs in Trade Agreements: Theory

3.1. Policy Substitution and Shallow Integration

3.2. Deep Integration

3.2.1. Political Economy: Commitment

3.2.2. Offshoring: Bilateral Bargaining Over Prices

3.2.3. Coordination Externalities

4. Treatment of NTMs in the WTO

4.1. Customs Regulations: Import

4.2. Customs Regulations: Export

4.3. Behind-the-Border Measures: Consumer, Product, and Process Regulations

4.3.1. National Treatment

4.3.2. Nonviolation Complaints

4.3.3. Transparency

5. Other Approaches to International Coordination Over NTMs

5.1. Mutual Recognition

5.2. Harmonization

5.3. Empirics

6. Conclusion

Appendix

Chapter 6: Preferential Trade Agreements

2. Stylized Facts and a Taxonomy

2.1. A Definition

2.2. Common Classification of PTAs and Their Evolution Over Time

2.3. A Taxonomy of ``Modern´´ PTAs

2.3.1. Depth in Economic Policy Cooperation

2.3.2. Breadth in Economic Policy Cooperation

2.3.3. Complementarity of Depth and Economic Breadth

2.3.4. Breadth in Noneconomic Policy Cooperation

2.4. Trends in Modern PTAs

2.4.1. Emerging Dimensions and Complementary Data

2.5. Stylized Facts

3. Trade and Welfare Effects on Members

3.1. Ex Post Trade Effects: Naïve Gravity and a PTA Formation ``Puzzle´´

3.1.1. Gravity Approach

3.1.2. Average Partial Effects and Selection Bias

3.1.3. Naïve Gravity

3.1.3.1. Small PTA Sample Size.

3.1.3.2. Choice of Controls

3.1.3.3. Sample Selection

3.2. Ex Post Trade Effects: Theory Consistent Estimates

3.2.1. Structural Gravity and Multilateral Trade Determinants

3.2.2. Endogenous PTAs and Bilateral Trade Determinants

3.2.3. Sample Issues and Heterogeneous PTA Effects

3.2.4. Summary

3.3. A PTA Trade Elasticity Puzzle?

3.3.1. The Magnitude and Timing of Aggregate PTA Effects

3.3.2. Puzzle: Definition and Existing Evidence

3.3.3. Puzzle: Novel Evidence

3.3.4. Features of Possible Explanations for the Elasticity Puzzle

3.4. Ex Post Estimates of WTO Trade Effects

3.5. General Equilibrium Trade and Welfare Effects of PTAs

4. Economic Effects of Deeper PTAs

4.1. Nontariff Barriers

4.2. Intermediates and Vertical Integration

4.3. Trade Policy Uncertainty (TPU) as a Motive for Trade Agreements

4.3.1. Sources of TPU

4.3.2. Direct Evidence of TPU Reductions via Agreements

4.4. A TPU-Investment Mechanism

4.4.1. Mechanism

4.4.2. TPU Augmented Industry Gravity

4.4.2.1. Export Values

4.4.2.2. Firms/Varieties

4.5. Ex Post Trade and Firm/Variety Entry Investment Estimates of Deeper PTAs

4.5.1. Expanding and Securing Existing Preferences

4.5.2. Average Treatment vs Policy Effects

4.5.3. PTAs as Insurance Against Trade Wars

4.6. Other Evidence and Future Work

5. PTA Formation and Policies: Motives and Determinants

5.1. Motives and Mechanisms

5.1.1. Traditional

5.1.1.1. Trade Creation and Diversion

5.1.1.2. Price Effects

5.1.2. Nontraditional

5.1.2.1. Endogenous Trade Policy

5.1.2.2. Deeper Trade Policy Cooperation and Bargaining Externalities

5.1.2.3. Broader Economic Motives

5.1.2.4. Nonpecuniary International Externalities

5.2. PTA and Preference Determinants.

5.2.1. Economic Determinants of PTAs Under Exogenous Tariffs: Binary Choice Approach.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters and index.

Description based on print version record.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

ISBN:

9780444639264

0444639268

9780444639226

0444639225

OCLC:

962450269