Handbook of the Economics of Matching.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Che, Yeon-Koo.

Contributor:

Yeon-Koo Che, Pierre-André Chiappori, Bernard Salanié

Series:

Handbook of the Economics of Matching Series

Handbook of the Economics of Matching Series ; v.Volume 2

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Matching theory.

Resource allocation.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (662 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Chantilly : Elsevier Science & Technology, 2025.

Summary:

Handbook of the Economics of Matching, Volume Two summarizes both classic results and the many recent advances on matching without transfers.Its seven chapters, written by leading researchers, cover both theoretical and empirical work and include sections on Matching under Non-transferable Utility: Theory, Empirical Approaches to Climate Change.

Contents:

Front Cover

Handbook of the Economics of Matching

Copyright

Introduction to the series

Contents

List of contributors

Preface

References

1 Matching under non-transferable utility: theory

1 Economics of matching and property rights

1.1 Model classification

2 Matching with private ownership

2.1 Matching markets as exchange economies

2.1.1 Properties of matchings and solution concepts

2.1.2 Direct mechanisms

2.2 Pure exchange markets with unit demand and endowment: housing markets

2.2.1 Core and competitive equilibria

2.2.2 The core as a direct mechanism

2.2.3 Extensions

2.3 Two-sided one-to-one matching markets: opposite-sex marriage

2.3.1 Stable matchings

2.3.2 Desirable mechanisms and revelation games induced by mechanisms

2.4 Two-sided many-to-one matching markets: college admissions

2.4.1 Colleges with responsive preferences

2.4.2 Colleges with substitutable choice rules

2.4.3 Extension: two-sided many-to-many matching markets

2.4.4 Extension: fixed-point approaches for characterizing stable matchings

2.5 Bilateral matching markets with unit demand

2.5.1 Bilateral matching with strict preferences: roommates problem

Stability and the core

Mechanisms

2.5.2 Bilateral matching with compatibility-based preferences: pairwise kidney exchange problem and the matching matroid on ...

Matroids

Matching matroid and pairwise kidney exchange problem

The structure of Pareto-efficient and individually rational matchings

Extension: two-sided matching with compatibility based preferences

3 Matching with common or mixed ownership

3.1 Matching with common ownership

3.1.1 Core from assigned endowments

3.1.2 Priority mechanism

3.1.3 Lottery mechanisms: random priority and core from random endowments.

3.2 Efficiency and fairness in random house allocation

3.2.1 A stochastic model of house allocation under utility representations

Environments

Lotteries and random assignments

Cardinal vs. ordinal mechanisms

Ex-post, ex-ante, SD efficient mechanisms under basic fairness properties

3.2.2 Probabilistic serial mechanism

Stochastic dominance envy-freeness

3.2.3 Competitive equilibrium from equal incomes

3.3 Matching with mixed ownership

3.3.1 House allocation with a single existing tenant: a basic exercise in minimalist market design

3.3.2 House allocation with existing tenants

3.4 "Trading houses" in common ownership economies

3.4.1 Hierarchical exchange mechanisms

3.4.2 Trading cycles mechanisms

3.5 Other remarks

3.5.1 Indifferences in preferences

3.5.2 Axiomatic characterizations of mechanisms in common and mixed ownership economies

3.5.3 Common ownership with multi-unit demand

3.5.4 House allocation mechanisms under constraints

4 Matching under priority-based entitlements

4.1 Student placement under no justified envy

4.1.1 Associated college admissions problem

4.1.2 No justified envy and other axioms

4.1.3 No justified envy vs. stability

4.1.4 Student placement with uniform scores

4.1.5 Student-optimal stable mechanism and its unique appeal

4.1.6 A characterization of no justified envy through cutoffs

4.1.7 Cutoff equilibria

4.1.8 Extension: weak priorities

4.2 Reserve systems

4.2.1 The model and no justified envy under identical positions

4.2.2 Sequential reserve rules

4.2.3 Reserve problems under a baseline priority order

4.2.4 Sequential reserve rules under a baseline priority order

4.2.5 Limitations of sequential reserve rules

4.2.6 Meritorious reserve rules and transversal matroids

Smart reserve rules.

4.2.7 Incentives in reserve systems regarding category membership revelation

4.2.8 Reserve systems with heterogeneous positions

2 Matching in large markets

1 Introduction

2 Large school model

2.1 Azevedo and Leshno (2016) model and asymptotic uniqueness of stable matching

2.2 Strategic issues in the large matching markets

2.2.1 Incentives for schools

2.2.2 Incentives for students

2.3 Non-substitutable preferences

3 Small school model

3.1 Model and preliminaries

3.2 Payoff and fairness performances of efficient mechanisms

3.2.1 Payoffs equivalence of efficient mechanisms

3.2.2 Fairness performances of efficient mechanisms

3.3 Welfare performances of stable mechanisms

3.3.1 Welfare performances of stable mechanisms under pure private values

3.3.2 Asymptotic payoff equivalence of stable mechanisms under pure private values

3.3.3 Welfare of stable mechanisms in the general environment

3.4 The efficiency/fairness tradeoff in large matching markets

3.4.1 Deferred acceptance with circuit breaker

Description of DACB

3.4.2 Practical relevance: implications from NYC school choice

4 Concluding remarks

3 Matching under non-transferable utility: applications

2 Living-donor kidney exchange

2.1 Background

2.1.1 Constraints to donation: medical compatibility

2.1.2 Transplantation policies

2.1.3 Kidney exchange as an application in market design

2.2 A general kidney exchange model

2.3 The initial model and top-trading cycles and chains mechanism

2.4 Forging a partnership between market designers and transplant surgeons in creating the New England kidney exchange program

2.5 Two-way kidney exchange with compatibility-based preferences

2.6 The significance of three-way kidney exchange.

2.6.1 The integration of larger-size exchanges to kidney exchange

2.7 Altruistic donor and deceased-donor chains

2.8 Worldwide market design initiatives for kidney exchange

2.9 Frictions that potentially increase the scope of kidney exchange

2.9.1 Leveraging temporal incompatibility

2.9.2 Leveraging financial incompatibility through global kidney exchange

2.10 How to maximize the benefit from kidney exchange?

2.10.1 Addressing inefficiencies in collaborative kidney exchange programs

2.10.2 Incentivizing compatible pairs to participate in exchange

3 Living-donor liver exchange

3.1 Background

3.2 Liver exchange model with two individual/graft sizes

3.2.1 Matchings with left-lobe-only two-way exchanges

3.2.2 Incentives for right-lobe donation

3.2.3 An incentive-compatible and Pareto-efficient mechanism

3.3 Liver exchange programs

3.3.1 Liver exchange programs in South Korea, India and the US

3.3.2 Banu Bedestenci Sönmez liver paired exchange (BBS-LPE) system at Malatya ̇Inönü University, Turkey

4 Cadet-branch matching in the US Army

4.1 Background

4.1.1 BRADSO program and the 2006 branching reform

The USMA-2006 mechanism

Shortcomings of the USMA-2006 mechanism

The initial proposal of the cumulative offer mechanism

4.1.2 USMA-2020 mechanism

4.1.3 Army's partnership with market designers

4.2 Formal model

4.2.1 Outcome and mechanism

4.2.2 The Army's policy objectives as formal axioms

4.3 Army's new mechanism: dual-price cumulative offer mechanism

4.4 The characterization result

4.4.1 Broader implications of analysis

4.5 Broader implications and proof-of-concept for minimalist market design

5 Affirmative action in India

5.1 Vertical and horizontal reservations

5.1.1 Stand-alone implementation of VR policy: Indra Sawhney (1992).

5.1.2 Joint implementation of VR and HR policies: Anil Kumar Gupta (1995)

5.1.3 Limitations of the SCI-AKG choice rule and their adverse implications

Root cause of the failures of the SCI-AKG choice rule

Litigations related to the axiom of no justified envy

Litigations related to the failure of incentive compatibility

5.1.4 Addressing the failures: two-step minimum guarantee choice rule

5.1.5 Constitutional resolution: Saurav Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2020)

5.2 Formal model

5.3 Analysis for non-overlapping HR protections

5.4 Overlapping HR protections

5.4.1 Generalized HR-maximality function and meritorious horizontal choice rule

5.4.2 2-Step meritorious horizontal choice rule

5.5 Indian affirmative action with multiple institutions

5.6 Extensions: some other applications of reserve systems

6 Entry-level physician matching markets and unraveling of their appointment dates

6.1 Background

6.2 Unraveling of transactions in matching markets, centralization, and the stability hypothesis

6.3 Calls for doctor-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism

6.4 Addressing the "couples problem" in medical matching

6.5 Other developments in the NRMP matching market

6.6 Extension: design of Israeli Psychology Master's match

6.7 Extension: matching with distributional constraints

7 Course allocation at universities

7.1 The model and earlier mechanisms adopted in the field

7.1.1 Random priority mechanism

7.1.2 UMBS pseudo auction

7.1.3 HBS draft mechanism

7.2 Approximate CEEI as a course allocation mechanism

7.3 Other designs for course allocation

7.4 Extension: allocation of food to food banks

8 Other notable applications

8.1 Centralized school admissions through exams as an application of matching under priority-based entitlements.

8.2 Design for school choice mechanisms as an application of matching under priority-based entitlements.

Notes:

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Part of the metadata in this record was created by AI, based on the text of the resource.

ISBN:

0-443-42863-8

0-443-42864-6

9780443428647

OCLC:

1559407618