Handbook of industrial organization. Volume 5 / Kate Ho, Ali Hortacsu and Alessandro Lizzeri.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Ho, Katherine, author.

Hortaçsu, Ali, author.

Lizzeri, Alessandro, author.

Series:

Handbooks in economics.

Handbooks in economics

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Industrial organization--History.

Industrial organization.

Industrial organization (Economic theory)--Mathematical models.

Industrial organization (Economic theory).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (784 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Amsterdam : Elsevier, [2021]

Summary:

Handbook of Industrial Organization Volume 4 highlights new advances in the field, with this new volume presenting interesting chapters.Each chapter is written by an international board of authors.- Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics series- Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields- A source, reference and.

Contents:

Front Cover

Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 5

Copyright

Contents

Contributors

Introduction to the series

Preface

10 Market design

1 Introduction

2 Theoretical framework

2.1 Taxonomy of market design problems

2.1.1 Matching or allocation?

2.1.2 Transferable utility or non-transferable utility?

2.1.3 Single-unit vs. multi-unit demand?

2.1.4 Endowments?

2.1.5 Clarification: are schools in school-choice agents or objects?

2.2 Canonical market design problems

2.3 Canonical market-design mechanisms

2.3.1 Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance

Key property: stability

Key property: strategy-proof or approximately strategy-proof

Key property: no justified envy

Many-to-one variant

Azevedo-Leshno price-theoretic interpretation of Gale-Shapley ("cutoff structure")

Hatfield-Milgrom connection between Gale-Shapley and simultaneous ascending auctions

2.3.2 Immediate acceptance ("Boston mechanism")

Key difference versus deferred acceptance

The cutoff structure of immediate acceptance

Discussion: strategic manipulability and efficiency

2.3.3 Random serial dictatorship

Connection to deferred acceptance

Key properties: strategy-proof and ex-post Pareto efficient

2.3.4 Top trading cycles

Connection to competitive equilibrium

2.3.5 Hylland and Zeckhauser pseudomarket

The pseudomarket equilibrium

Connection to the immediate acceptance algorithm

Properties: ex-ante efficient, SP-L

2.3.6 Draft approaches to multi-unit assignment

2.3.7 Competitive equilibrium approaches to multi-unit assignment

Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (A-CEEI)

Multi-unit generalization of Hylland-Zeckhauser probability shares market

Feeding America artificial-currency market.

3 Empirical frameworks and applications

3.1 Non-transferable utility models

3.1.1 Random utility model

3.1.2 Analysis with data from assignment mechanisms

3.1.3 Analysis with data on final outcomes

Continuum many-to-one matching

One-to-one or few-to-one matching

3.2 Transferable utility models

3.2.1 Models with separable unobserved heterogeneity

3.2.2 Semi-parametric approaches

3.3 Extensions

4 Designing markets

4.1 Diagnosing market failures

4.2 Evaluating and comparing designs

4.3 Proposing new market designs

5 Conclusion

References

11 Empirical perspectives on auctions

2 Timber auctions

2.1 Reserve price and revenue optimization

2.2 Bidders' entry

2.3 Tests of common value and affiliation

2.4 Bidders' risk aversion

2.5 Collusion

2.6 Market design insights

2.6.1 Set asides and subsidies

2.6.2 Scale bidding

2.6.3 Sequential vs. simultaneous bid submission

2.6.4 Resale

3 Procurement auctions of construction projects and services

3.1 Asymmetries across bidders and unobservable heterogeneity

3.2 Private or common values?

3.3 Entry and competition

3.4 Collusion

3.5 Cost synergies and combinatorial auctions

3.6 Dynamic auctions

3.7 Subcontracting

3.8 Scaling and scoring rules

3.9 Ex post uncertainty, incomplete contracts, and renegotiation

3.10 Bidding preferences toward minority-owned and small businesses

4 Oil and gas lease auctions

4.1 Common value and winner's curse

4.2 Bidding and drilling

4.3 Miscellaneous

5 Online auctions

5.1 Bidding dynamics and sniping in online proxy auctions

5.2 Structural econometric models of proxy auctions

5.3 Online trust

5.4 Auctions vs. fixed prices

5.5 Beyond proxy auctions

6 Internet advertising auctions

6.1 Modeling sponsored search auctions.

6.2 Empirical work

6.3 Reserve prices in sponsored search auctions

7 Electricity auctions

7.1 Models of bidding in electricity markets

7.2 Tests of theory

7.3 Estimating generation costs

7.4 Forward contracts and sequential markets

7.5 Transmission constraints

8 Auctions in financial markets

8.1 Treasury auctions

8.1.1 Discrete bids

8.1.2 Private vs. common values and the role of dealers

8.2 Municipal bond auctions

8.3 Auctions in central bank operations

8.4 Derivatives markets

8.5 Takeover auctions

8.5.1 Auctions of insolvent banks

9 Spectrum auctions

9.1 Empirical work on spectrum auctions

9.2 Incentive auctions

10 Auctions of used goods

10.1 Used car auctions

10.2 Auctions of collectible goods: a case study in collusion

11 Concluding remarks

Acknowledgments

12 Collusion, mergers, and related antitrust issues

2 Collusion

2.1 How much collusion is there?

2.2 How does collusion work?

2.2.1 How agreements start

2.2.2 How agreements are structured

2.2.3 How agreements are enforced

2.2.4 Cartels and the threat of entry

2.3 Detection

2.4 Impact of collusion on market performance

3 Mergers

3.1 Efficiencies and other mitigating factors

3.2 Screens

3.3 Unilateral effects analysis

3.3.1 The basic theory of unilateral effects

3.3.2 Empirical implementation: merger simulation and UPP

3.3.3 Horizontal mergers under free entry

3.3.4 Dynamic considerations

3.3.5 Endogenizing the choice of merger

3.3.6 Investment and innovation

3.3.7 Product quality and positioning

3.3.8 Bargaining power effects

3.4 Coordinated effects analysis

3.5 Vertical mergers

3.5.1 Vertical mergers and the elimination of double margins

3.5.2 Foreclosure effects

3.5.3 Coordinated effects

3.6 Remedies.

3.7 Overall impact and merger retrospectives

3.8 Emergent issues relating to mergers

4 Conclusion

A Summary of merger retrospectives

13 Innovation: market failures and public policies

1.1 Market failures and innovation

1.2 Innovation and growth

1.3 Empirical challenges

1.3.1 Measurement challenges

1.3.2 Inference challenges

1.4 Overview of this chapter

2 Science as a non-market incentive

2.1 What drives the rate and direction of scientific research?

2.2 Knowledge production: the burden of knowledge hypothesis

2.3 How should science be funded?

3 Theory and evidence on market-based innovation policies

3.1 Taxes and innovation

3.2 Intellectual property rights

3.2.1 Patents: a primer

3.2.2 Intellectual property: theory

3.2.3 Intellectual property: evidence

3.3 Competition policy

3.4 Labor market policies

4 Innovation, diffusion, and growth

4.1 Measuring diffusion

4.2 Theories of diffusion

5 Innovation and inequality

5.1 Does innovation increase inequality?

5.2 Is inequality causing society to lose potential innovators?

6 Conclusion

14 The IO of selection markets

2 Some (brief) intellectual history

2.1 Selection market theory

2.2 The empirical testing literature

3 Theoretical framework

3.1 Setting and notation

3.2 Definitions and terminology

3.3 Road map

4 Empirical models of demand in selection markets

5 Pricing and equilibrium with selection

5.1 Perfect competition

5.2 Imperfect competition

5.3 Endogenous contract design

5.4 Rejections and customized pricing

6 Welfare

6.1 Customized pricing and reclassification risk

6.2 Demand vs. welfare

7 Looking ahead

15 The industrial organization of financial markets

1 Introduction.

2 A model of financial intermediation

3 Wholesale funding markets

3.1 Market for government debt

3.1.1 Using auction data to study financial markets

3.1.2 Estimation of willingness-to-pay

3.1.3 Evaluating the performance of the auction mechanism

3.1.4 Quantifying market power

3.1.5 Quantification of front-running and testing for private values

Private versus interdependent values in treasury bill auctions

Quantifying the order flow

3.1.6 Mapping bids into a demand system for government securities

3.2 Secondary market and demand for liquidity

3.2.1 Auction mechanisms

3.2.2 Over-the-counter markets

4 Retail funding markets

4.1 Framework

4.2 Sources of market power

4.2.1 Measuring product differentiation

Entry models

4.2.2 Measuring switching costs

4.2.3 Other sources of market power

4.3 Market power in retail funding markets and financial stability

5 Retail credit markets

5.1 Modeling framework

5.2 Asymmetric information and default risk

5.3 Market power and search frictions

Evidence: price dispersion and search

Model: price competition with search frictions

Extensions: adverse-selection, price ceilings, and repayment risk

6 Regulation of financial markets

6.1 Financial stability and regulation

6.1.1 Deposit insurance

6.1.2 Capital regulations

6.1.3 Competition and stability

Entry regulations

Competition from shadow banks

6.2 Lending price regulations

6.3 Intermediaries and agency problems

7 Conclusion

16 The industrial organization of health care markets

2 Insurers and providers: competition and antitrust

2.1 Facts about insurer and provider prices and competition

2.1.1 Insurer concentration and premium variation

2.1.2 Insurer network differentiation.

2.1.3 Provider price dispersion and provider consolidation.

Notes:

Description based on print version record.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

ISBN:

9780323988889

0323988881

OCLC:

1290021488