The EU's Liability for Its Refugee Camps : Responsibility for Fundamental Rights Violations in the Integrated EU Hotspot Administration.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Ziebritzki, Catharina.

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource (412 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Baden-Baden : Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2025.

Contents:

Cover

Introduction

1 EU Hotspots as a Critical Challenge to Human Rights

2 Europe's Largest Refugee Camps

3 The EU's Judicial Responsibility (Research Question)

4 The EU's Liability for EU Hotspots (Thesis)

5 State of Research and Contribution of this Study

6 Typical Case Constellations

7 Method

Chapter 1: The EU's New Role in the Asylum Administration

1 Granting and Threatening Rights

1.1 The EU as an 'Ordinary' and Ambivalent Public Actor

1.2 The EU as a Critical Actor in Asylum Administration

1.3 The Failure to Regulate the EU's Responsibility

1.4 The Challenge to Redefine the EU's Responsibility

2 EU Hotspots as a Paradigm Example of the EU's New Role

2.1 From Initial EU Hotspots to 'EU Hotspots 2.0'

a The Initial EU Hotspot Approach of 2015

b The EU-Türkiye Statement of March 2016: From Relocation to Return

c Political Insistence on a Non-Functional Return Policy

d The EU Hotspot Approach 2.0 of 2020

2.2 Regulatory Framework: Crisis and Informality

a Relevant Informal Rules as EU Soft Law

b In Search for a Legal Basis in Primary Law

c Belated Formalisation in National and EU Secondary Law

d Formalisation of Key Elements in EU Secondary Law and Remaining Regulatory Gaps

e Persisting Relevance of Informal Rules and Logic of Crisis

2.3 EU Hotspots as a Testing Ground

3 The EU's Main Administrative Actors

3.1 The EU Asylum Agency (EUAA)

a The EUAA's Competences as a Political Compromise

b The EUAA's Internal Decision-Making Structure

3.2 The EU Border Agency (Frontex)

a Inter-Agency Cooperation as a Defining Feature of the European Asylum Administration

b Frontex's Competences and Internal Decision-Making Structures

3.3 The European Commission

a The Commission's Administrative Competences under Art. 17 para 1 TEU.

b The Commission's Internal Decision-Making Structures

4 The EU's Main Forms of Administrative Cooperation

4.1 Administrative Support

a Reception-Related and Procedure-Related Support

b Administrative Support and EU Responsibility

4.2 Administrative Supervision

a Operational Supervision as a Consolidated Form of Supervision

b Monitoring as an Emerging Form of Supervision

4.3 'Determining Without Deciding'

a Factual Conduct as a Strategy to Evade Judicial Review

b Ensuring Judicial Review by Unfolding the Potential of EU Constitutional Law

Chapter 2: The Integrated EU Hotspot Administration

1 Operational Level

1.1 A Multitude of Actors

1.2 The 'Migration Management Support Teams'

1.3 The Agencies' Procedure-Related Support

a Identification and First Registration

b Hearing and Examination of Claim

c Administrative and Judicial Appeals

d Deportation Procedure

1.4 The Agencies' Reception-Related Support

2 Supervisory Level

2.1 Belated Consolidation of the Commission's Supervision

2.2 Coordination and Ensuring Legality

2.3 Procedure-Related vs. Reception-Related Supervision

2.4 Reduced Discretion in Case of Systemic Deficiencies

2.5 The Agencies' Obligation to Assist the Commission

2.6 The Commission's Institutional Supervisory Structure

a The European Regional Task Force (EURTF)

b The Steering Committee

c Deployment of Staff to the Ground

d The Dedicated Task Force Migration Management

2.7 The Commission's Concrete Supervisory Measures

3 Systemic Deficiencies in the EU Hotspot Administration

3.1 Reception-Related Deficiencies

a The Prohibition of Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (Art. 4 ChFR)

b The Prohibition of Systemic Detention of Asylum Seekers (Art. 6 ChFR)

3.2 Procedure-Related Deficiencies.

a The Right to Good Administration (Art. 41 ChFR)

b Specific Procedural Guarantees for Children (Art. 24 and Art. 41 ChFR)

c The Prohibition of Refoulement (Art. 4, 18, 19 ChFR)

i Why Türkiye is Not a Safe Third Country

ii The Administrative Practice in the EU Hotspots

3.3. Qualification as Systemic Deficiencies

4 Identifying Relevant Misconduct of EU Bodies

4.1 The EUAA's Misconduct at Operational Level

4.2 Frontex's Misconduct at Operational Level

4.3 The Commission's Misconduct at Supervisory Level

5 EU Responsibility for EU Hotspots?

Chapter 3: The Potential of EU Liability Law

1 Auxiliary Character of Non-Judicial Review

2 Structural Failure of Established Pathways to the CJEU

2.1 Failure of Enforcement From Above (Art. 258 TFEU)

a The Commission's Unequal Enforcement Policy

b Why the Commission's Practice is Problematic from a Broader Constitutional Perspective

2.2 Failure of Indirect Enforcement From Below (Art. 267 TFEU)

a Greek Courts' Failure to Refer Relevant Questions to the CJEU

b The Illegality of the Non-Referral Practice under Art. 267 para 3 TFEU

2.3 Failure of Direct Enforcement From Below via Annulment (Art. 263, 265 TFEU)

a The Very Limited Potential of the Annulment Procedure and the Action for Failure to Act

b Challenging Non-Formally Binding Conduct via Art. 263, 265 TFEU?

3 Potential of the Action for Damages (Art. 340 para 2 TFEU)

3.1 Preconditions, Potentials and Pitfalls

3.2 Interpreting in Light of the Constitutional Standard

a The Legal Protection Gap Argument: A Broad Reading of Art. 340 para 2 TFEU

b The Action for Damages as a Mechanism for Vigilant Individuals

3.3 A Makeshift Fundamental Rights Remedy

a The Relevant Fundamental Rights as Individual Rights

b A Fundamental Rights Violation as a Sufficiently Serious Breach.

c A Fundamental Rights Violation as a Damage

3.4 Towards Declaratory Relief

a Towards Restitution in Kind and Recognition of Unlawfulness

b From the Function of Compensation to Declaratory Relief

c Lowering the Threshold for Liability: A Project De Lege Ferenda

4 The Action for Damages and the EU Hotspot Administration

4.1 Defining the Potential Trigger for EU Liability

4.2 A Sufficiently Serious Breach and Individual Rights

4.3 Legal Basis in Case of the Agencies

5 Doctrinal Approach

5.1 Concepts of Attribution and Causation

5.2 Imputation and the 'Normative Bridge Function'

5.3 Specific Doctrinal Questions

a The Agencies' Liability for Inherent Violations: A Question of Attribution

b The Agencies' Liability for Resulting Violations: A Question of Causation I

c The Commission's Liability for Resulting Violations: A Question of Causation II

5.4 Non-Applicability of DARS and DARIO

5.5 Case Law Relevant to the Doctrine on EU Liability

Chapter 4: Attribution of Conduct to the EU

1 Emerging Doctrine on Attribution

1.1 Public Conduct vs. Ultra Vires Conduct

1.2 Union Conduct vs. Intergovernmental Conduct

2 Internal Competence and External Appearance

2.1 External Appearance Criterion

2.2 Internal Competence Criterion

2.3 Relationship Between the Criteria

3 Conclusions on Attribution

3.1 Attribution of Conduct to the EUAA

3.2 Attribution of Conduct to Frontex

3.3 The Agencies' Liability for Inherent Violations

Chapter 5: Causation of Fundamental Rights Violations by the EU

1 Causation in Multi-Actor Situations

1.1 Failure of the Conventional Causation Criterion

1.2 Why WS et al. vs. Frontex is No Counterargument

2 Doctrine on Causation I: Lessons from KYDEP

2.1 Liability for Administrative Support

2.2 Liability for Non-Formally Binding Conduct.

2.3 Confirmation of the 'KYDEP Doctrine'

a The First Post-KYDEP Generation - from Geotronics to Camós Grau

b The Second Post-KYDEP Generation - Tillack and Arizmendi

c The Third Post-KYDEP Generation - Ledra and Bourdouvali

3 Doctrine on Causation II: Lessons from Ledra

3.1 Liability for Breach of Supervisory Obligation

3.2 Liability for Breach of Supervisory Standard

a The Doctrinal Shift From Supervisory Obligations Under Secondary Law to Art. 17 TEU

b The Doctrinal Shift From the Supervisory Obligation to the Supervisory Standard

4 The De Facto Bindingness Threshold

4.1 Degree of Bindingness as Decisive Factor

4.2 Degree of Bindingness in Case of Omission

4.3 Decisive Criteria Establishing De Facto Bindingness

a Financial Incentives or Pressure

b Political Authority

c Superior Technical Expertise or Information

5 Conclusions on Causation

5.1 The Agencies' Individual Recommendations

5.2 The Commission's Failure to Supervise

5.3 The EU's Liability for Resulting Violations

Conclusion

1 Doctrinal Analysis in a Politicised Context

2 Why WS et al. vs. Frontex Should Not Discourage

3 Why Claiming Damages From the EU is Worth a Try

Bibliography.

Notes:

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

ISBN:

3-7489-4972-3