The instability of reason : Śrīharṣa on the foundations of epistemology / Nilanjan Das.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Das, Nilanjan, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Śrīharṣa.

Nyaya.

Physical Description:

1 online resource

Other Title:

Śrīharṣa on the foundations of epistemology

Place of Publication:

Oxford ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2026]

Summary:

In premodern south Asia, epistemology, the study of knowledge and the methods of acquiring it, was rarely construed as a purely theoretical enterprise. It was a discipline intended to serve practical purposes. This approach to epistemology is found in the philosophical tradition called Nyaya. The defenders of this tradition, the Naiyayikas, took Nyaya to be a science of rational inquiry that could assist practitioners of other sciences like economics and government in realizing their aims. These thinkers were committed to rationalism. Though this view was popular in premodern South Asia, it wasn't without its critics. In this monograph, Das focuses on one such critic: Sriharsa. Sriharsa agreed with the Naiyayikas that liberation, is the highest aim of human existence, and that we can achieve it by discovering the truth about the self and its relation to the world. But he rejected the claim that rational inquiry can help us discover that truth.

Contents:

Cover

Half Title

Title Page

Copyright Page

Dedication

Table of Contents

Preface

Acknowledgements

Note on Editions of the Text

1 Introduction

1.1 Śrīharṣa as a Non-Dualist

1.2 Śrīharṣa's Project in the Refutation

1.3 Two Kinds of Anti-Rationalism

1.4 Śrīharṣa as a Strong Anti-Rationalist

1.4.1 Conceptual Background

1.4.2 The Theme

1.4.3 The Plan

1.5 Why Śrīharṣa Was Not a Sceptic

2 Method

2.1 The Method of Definition in Early Nyāya

2.1.1 The Method of Definition in Very Early Nyāya

2.1.2 The Paradox of Definitions.

2.1.3 Two Solutions

2.2 Śrīharṣa's Method of Refutation

2.3 The Purpose of Refutation Arguments

2.4 The Philosophical Significance of Refutation Arguments

2.4.1 The Thesis of Indescribability

2.4.2 Epistemic Or Metaphysical Indeterminacy?

2.5 The Scope of Refutation Arguments

3 Aboutness

3.1 Three Theories of Intentionality

3.1.1 Intentionality as Causation Plus Resemblance

3.1.2 Intentionality as the Event-Patient Relation

3.1.3 Intentionality as an Internal Relation

3.2 Against Reductionism

3.2.1 Against the Sautrāntika View.

3.2.2 Against the Bhāṭṭa View

3.2.2.1 Apprehendedness

3.2.2.2 Activity

3.3 Against Non-Reductionism, Part I: The Nature of Representational Properties

3.3.1 An Initial Dilemma

3.3.2 The Dilemma Strengthened

3.4 Against Non-Reductionism, Part II: The Problem of Immanence

3.4.1 The Argument

3.4.2 Objections and Replies

3.5 Against Non-Reductionism, Part III: Lack of Informativity

3.6 Is Śrīharṣa's Position Coherent?

4 Accuracy

4.1 Three Conceptions of Accuracy

4.2 The Partial Knowledge Constraint

4.3 Against the True Nature View.

4.3.1 The Problem of Partial Knowledge

4.3.2 The Problem of Misattribution

4.3.3 The Problem of Spatiotemporal Location

4.3.4 Summary

4.4 Against the Objective Match View

4.4.1 What Kind of Resemblance?

4.4.2 The Problem of Knowledge Simpliciter

4.4.3 The Problem of Partial Knowledge Redux

4.4.4 Summary

4.5 The Non-Deviation View

4.5.1 Non-Deviation as Lack of Disagreement

4.5.2 Counterarguments

4.5.3 Generalizations

4.6 Accuracy in Later Nyāya

5 Remembering

5.1 The Non-Mnemic Condition in Early Nyāya

5.2 Firsthand Awareness-Events as a Natural Kind.

5.3 The Argument From Recognition

5.4 Against the Disunity View

5.5 Against the Hybridity View

5.6 The Firsthandness View

5.7 The Upshot

5.8 Objections and Replies

5.9 The Argument From Recognition in Later Nyāya

6 Luck

6.1 Epistemic Luck in Early Nyāya Epistemology

6.2 The Problem of Epistemic Luck

6.3 The Response From Causal Infallibilism

6.3.1 Two Kinds of Causal Infallibilism

6.3.2 Śrīharṣa On Virtue Infallibilism

6.3.3 Śrīharṣa On Defect Infallibilism

6.4 The Response From Inaccuracy

6.4.1 Three Problems.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (Oxford Academic, viewed on July 6, 2026).

Other Format:

Print version : Das, Nilanjan. Instability of reason.

ISBN:

9780191945342

019194534X

OCLC:

1574925614

Publisher Number:

CIPO000359166

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license