Social and applied hinge epistemology / Annalisa Coliva.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Coliva, Annalisa, 1973- author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Justification (Theory of knowledge).

Knowledge, Sociology of.

Knowledge, Theory of.

sociology of knowledge.

epistemology.

Physical Description:

1 online resource

Place of Publication:

New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2026]

Summary:

This book introduces readers to a fresh approach in philosophy called "hinge epistemology," originally developed to explain how we justify our everyday beliefs and to respond to radical skepticism. It expands this framework into real-world issues, showing how our most basic assumptions--our "hinges"--shape social life and knowledge. The book explores topics such as trust, testimony, deep disagreement, conspiracy theories, and psychiatric delusions, as well as issues of justice, gender, and even trust in artificial intelligence. Accessible yet rigorous, it demonstrates how philosophy can illuminate pressing challenges in contemporary society.

Hinge epistemology was originally developed as an account of perceptual justification and as a response to Cartesian and Humean skepticism. Annalisa Coliva offers a systematic extension of hinge epistemology into the domains of social and applied epistemology. She advances a novel hinge-theoretic framework that distinguishes between de jure and de facto hinges, a distinction that allows for a nuanced analysis of a broad range of epistemological and social issues. She applies this framework to central debates on common knowledge, genealogical challenges, deep disagreement, and the nature of testimonial justification and trust, including pressing questions surrounding trust in artificial intelligence.

Contents:

Cover

Half Title

Title Page

Copyright Page

Dedication

Contents

Acknowledgments

Credits

Introduction: From HE to SHE

I.1. From HE to SHE

I.2. Constitutivist Hinge Epistemology

I.3. De Jure and De Facto Hinges-A Quick Pass

I.4. The Structure of the Book

Part I De Jure and De Facto Hinges

1 De Jure and De Facto Hinges

1.0. Introduction

1.1. De Jure v. De Facto Hinges: Beyond On Certainty

1.1.1. De Jure Hinges

1.1.2. De Facto (Empirical) Hinges

1.2. De Facto Non-Empirical Hinges

2 Hinges and Common and Procedural Knowledge

2.0. Introduction

2.1. Hinges and Three Theoretical Desiderata

2.2. Easy Knowledge and Testimonial Knowledge of Hinges

2.3. Hinges, Common Knowledge, and the Assertion Problem

2.4. From Common Knowledge to Procedural Knowledge

2.5. Conclusions

3 Deep Disagreements and the Genealogical Challenge

3.0. Introduction

3.1. YJBTB It's a Hinge

3.2. On the Rationality of YJBTB It's a Hinge

3.3. Varieties of Hinges and of Reasons for Fitting into the YJBTB Schema

3.3.1. Harmless Instances of YJBTB It's a Hinge

3.3.2. Problematic Instances of YJBTB It's a Hinge

3.3.3. Comparison with Other Disagreement Accounts

3.4. The Rationality of YJBT There Are Physical Objects Because It's a Hinge

3.5. YJBTB It's a Moral Hinge

3.6. Conclusions

Part II Hinges, Testimony, and Trust

4 Testimonial Hinges

4.0. Introduction

4.1. Liberals, Moderates, and Conservatives: From Perceptual to Testimonial Justification

4.2. Reductionism versus Anti-Reductionism: A Reinterpretation

4.3. Moderatism About Testimonial Justification and the Extended View of Social Epistemic Rationality

4.4. Beyond Global Moderatism

4.4.1. Birth

4.5. Objections and Replies

5 Hinge Trust

5.0. Introduction

5.1. Hinge Trust in On Certainty.

5.1.1. The Transcendental and Psychological Priority of Hinge Trust

5.1.2. The Phenomenology of Hinge Trust

5.2. Hinge Trust and Current Debates About Trust

5.3. The Ontological and Axiological Priority of (Hinge) Trust over Distrust

5.3.1. (Dis-)trusting for a Reason

5.4. Hinge Trust, Hinge Epistemology and Testimonial Hinges

6 Hinges and AI: From Hinge Trust to e-Trust

6.0. Introduction

6.1. Who Is the Trustee in e-Trust?

6.2. Is e-Trust Possible?

6.2.1. Is e-Trust Possible if Trust Is a Morally Loaded Notion?

6.2.2. Is e-Trust Possible if Trust Is Not a Morally Loaded Notion?

6.3. e-Trust as Hinge Trust

6.4. The Trustworthiness of AI

6.5. Conclusion

Part III Hinges, Epistemic Injustice, and Conceptual Engineering

7 Hinges, Prejudices, and Testimonial Injustice

7.0. Introduction

7.1. Boncompagni's Hinge-Prejudices

7.2. Are Identity Prejudices Hinges or Just Hinge-Like?

7.3. Identity Prejudices, Hinges, and Testimonial Justification

8 Hysteria, Hermeneutical Injustice, and Conceptual Engineering

8.0. Introduction

8.1. Hysteria: A Brief History of a Complex Concept

8.2. Hysteria and Hermeneutical Injustice

8.3. Hysteria, Hermeneutical Injustice, and Conceptual Engineering

8.4. Fixing Hysteria

8.5. Conclusion

9 More and Happier Women: On the Political Significance of Wittgenstein and Hinge Epistemology

9.0. Introduction

9.1. The Carnapian, Top-Down Approach

9.2. The Wittgensteinian Bottom-Up Approach

9.2.1. Woman as a Family Resemblance Concept

9.2.2. Amelioration à la Wittgenstein and "Serious Politics"

9.3. Externalism and Objectivity on a Wittgensteinian Approach

9.4. Hinges and Hermeneutical Injustice

9.5. Quietism, Activism, and Imagination

PART IV Hinges, Delusions, and Conspiracy Theories

10 Delusional Hinges

10.0. Introduction.

10.1. Extant Hinge Accounts of Delusions

10.1.1. Delusions: Hinges, Not Beliefs

10.1.2. The Rationality of Delusions

10.1.3. The Intelligibility of Delusions

10.2. Taking Stock: A "Moderate" Hinge-Account of Delusions

10.3. Delusional Hinges and Relativism

11 Conspiracy Hinges, Delusions, and Mystical Experiences: Or: When Numbers Don't Count

11.0. Introduction

11.1. Conspiracy Theories: Hinges, Not Beliefs

11.2. Conspiracy Theorists: Irrational, Not Insane

11.3. How (Not) to Distinguish Between Conspiracy Theories and Delusions (Or: When Numbers Don't Count)

11.4. Coda: Mystical or Delusional Experiences? (Or: When Numbers Might Seem to Count)

11.5. Conclusions

Conclusions

Bibliography

Index.

2 Hinges and Common and Procedural Knowledge.

2.0. Introduction

3.3.2. Problematic Instances of YJBTB It's a Hinge.

3.3.3. Comparison with Other Disagreement Accounts

4.4.1. Birth.

4.5. Objections and Replies

5.1. Hinge Trust in On Certainty

5.1.1. The Transcendental and Psychological Priority of Hinge Trust

6.2. Is e-Trust Possible?

6.2.1. Is e-Trust Possible if Trust Is a Morally Loaded Notion?

8 Hysteria, Hermeneutical Injustice, and Conceptual Engineering.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (Oxford Academic, viewed on August 14, 2026).

Other Format:

Print version: Oxford handbook of social epistemology

ISBN:

9780197834022

0197834027

OCLC:

1587431898

Publisher Number:

CIPO000385263

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license