Oxford studies in metaethics. Volume 21 / edited by Russ Shafer-Landau.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Shafer-Landau, Russ, editor.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Metaethics.

Physical Description:

1 online resource

Other Title:

Studies in metaethics

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2026]

Summary:

'Oxford Studies in Metaethics' is devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field.

Contents:

Cover

Half Title

Title Page

Copyright Page

Contents

List of Contributors

Introduction

1 Fitting Action

1.1 Existing Accounts of Fitting Action

1.1.1 Fitting Action as Right Action

1.1.2 The Constitutive Norm Account

1.1.3 The Expressive Account

1.1.4 The Non-Utility-Based Reason Account

1.2 The Deontic Account

1.3 Implications of the Deontic Account

1.3.1 Fitting Action Matters

1.3.2 Fitting Actions Have Authoritative Normativity

1.3.3 Fittingness or Other Normative Properties First?

1.4 Objections

1.4.1 Gradeability

1.4.2 Neutrality.

1.4.3 Wrong Kind of Reason Cases

1.4.4 Other Counterexamples

References

2 Enticing Emotions

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Extant Solutions

2.2.1 Solutions to the Variable Demandingness Puzzle

2.2.2 Solutions to the Mutability Puzzle

2.3 The Enticing Emotions View

2.3.1 Enticing Reasons

2.3.2 Fit-Related Reasons for Emotion

2.3.3 Value-Related Reasons for Emotion

2.3.4 Combining Fit-Related and Value-Related Reasons for Emotion

2.4 How the Enticing Emotions View Solves the Puzzles

2.4.1 Solving the Variable Demandingness Puzzle.

2.4.2 Solving the Mutability Puzzle

2.5 Conclusion

3 Non-Naturalist Moral Causation

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Naturalism, Non-Naturalism, and Causation

3.3 Non-Naturalist Moral Causation

3.3.1 Difference-Making

3.3.2 Non-Naturalist Moral Metaphysics and Causation

3.3.3 Proportionality?

3.4 Objections

3.4.1 Rejecting the Moral Metaphysics

3.4.2 Revising the Moral Metaphysics

3.4.3 Rejecting or Revising the Causation Results

3.5 Conclusion

4 Non-Naturalism without Contingentism.

4.1 The Contingentist Reply to the Supervenience Challenge

4.2 Why Contingentism Is Bad News for Non-Naturalists

4.3 The Conceivability Argument

4.4 The Non-Naturalist Commitments Argument

4.5 Supervenience Revisited

5 Capturing Disagreement from the First-Person Perspective

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Two Perspectives on Disagreement

5.3 Making Sense of "Going Wrong"

5.3.1 Deflationary Accounts

5.3.2 Humean Constructivism

5.3.3 Realism, and Broadly Realist-Shaped Accounts

5.4 The Relationship between the First- and Third-Person Perspectives.

5.5 Why Not Error Theory?

Works Cited

6 Intelligibility, Idealism, and Alienation in Post-Kantian Metaethics

6.1 Normativity and Intelligibility

6.2 Normative Alienation

6.3 Non-Arbitrariness

6.4 The Function of Normative Concepts: Guidance, Governance, and Autonomy

6.5 Necessary Connection and Idealism in Metaethics

6.6 Arguments for Essential Intelligibility

6.7 The Essential Arbitrariness of the Normative Domain?

7 Exclusionary Reasons and the Balancing View of Ought

7.1 The Objection from Exclusionary Reasons.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (Oxford Academic, viewed on August 18, 2026).

Other Format:

Print version : Oxford studies in metaethics. Volume 21.

ISBN:

9780197903612

0197903614

OCLC:

1579013380

Publisher Number:

CIPO000364965

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.