Natural kinds and the science of perception : carving the mind at the joints / Henry Taylor.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Taylor, Henry, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Consciousness.

Memory.

Perception--Philosophy.

Perception.

Physical Description:

1 online resource : illustrations

illustration

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2026]

Summary:

We divide the mind into a series of distinct faculties, such as 'long-term memory', 'vision', 'consciousness', or 'perception'. Are these categories good ones? Could they be improved? This book draws on philosophical research on natural kinds to answer these questions.

This text brings research on taxonomy and natural kinds from the philosophy of science to bear on the science of perception. It defends a novel version of the property cluster view of natural kinds and uses it to explore many puzzling features of perception and cognition.

Contents:

Cover

Half Title

Title Page

Copyright Page

Dedication

Acknowledgements

Contents

Figures

Note to the Reader

1 Natural Kinds in Psychology

Summary

1.1 Natural kinds

1.2 Some terminology

1.3 Natural kinds: Two ideas

1.4 Property clusters, scientific usefulness, and responsiveness

1.5 The scope of the book

1.6 The plan for the book

2 Natural Kinds and Property Clusters: Why Long-Term Memory Is a Natural Kind

2.1 Cluster kinds: An introduction

2.2 Property clusters

2.3 Non-accidental co-occurrence

2.3.1 Mechanistic clusters

2.3.2 Simple causal clusters

2.3.3 Stable property clusters

2.4 Long-term memory and the metaphysics of cluster kinds

2.5 Epistemic roles

2.5.1 Generalizations

2.5.2 Prediction 1: Extrapolation

2.5.3 Prediction 2: Co-projection

2.5.4 Explanation

2.5.5 Discovery of novel properties

2.6 Conclusion

3 Property Clusters: In Defence of a Liberal Approach

3.1 Is (PNK) too liberal? Theoretical considerations

3.2 Is (PNK) too liberal? Counterexamples

3.3 Membership criteria and kindhood criteria

3.4 Conclusion

4 The Path to Eliminativism?: Natural Kinds and Conceptual Reform in Psychology

4.1 Natural kinds: The test of good science?

4.2 Cluster kinds and eliminativism

4.3 What kind of eliminativism?

4.4 Epistemic usefulness

4.5 Other metaphysical structures?

4.6 Other epistemic roles?

4.7 Back to eliminativism

4.8 Conclusion

5 The Two Visual Streams Hypothesis: Two Natural Kinds?

5.1 The two visual streams hypothesis

5.2 DF and the two visual streams hypothesis

5.3 Other subjects with neurological impairment

5.4 Separate clusters of properties

5.4.1 The Titchener/Ebbinghaus illusion

5.4.2 Action guidance and action planning.

5.4.3 Retention in memory

5.4.4 Frames of reference: allocentric and egocentric

5.5 Consciousness?

5.6 Non-accidental co-occurrence

5.7 The epistemic power of the two visual streams

5.7.1 Explanation, generalization, prediction

5.7.2 The discovery of novel properties: visual attention

5.8 Two visual streams: separate natural kinds

5.9 Neuroscientific or psychological kinds?

5.10 Conclusion

6 Is Vision a Natural Kind?

6.1 The natural kinds question about vision

6.2 Vision or visual episode?

6.3 The argument that visual episode is not a natural kind

6.4 Premise (1): Visual episodes in both streams

6.5 Premise (2): Cluster kinds

6.6 Premise (3): The heterogeneity of the visual

6.7 Premise (4): The absence of unity

6.7.1 Phenomenology

6.7.2 Properties of external objects

6.7.3 Sense organ

6.8 Objections and replies

6.9 Vision and mechanisms

6.10 Consequences of the heterogeneity of vision

7 The Mind's Central Station: The Science of Working Memory

7.1 The mind's central station

7.2 Five unifying properties of working memory

7.2.1 Persistence

7.2.2 The gatekeeper

7.2.3 Active manipulation

7.2.4 Who does working memory talk to?

7.2.5 Limited capacity

7.2.6 Summary

7.3 Diversity in informational format

7.4 Non-accidental co-occurrence and psychological explanation

7.4.1 Partial report

7.4.2 Change detection

7.4.3 Non-accidental co-occurrence

7.5 Scepticism about working memory

7.5.1 Working memory and sensory recruitment

7.5.2 Maintenance and manipulation

7.6 Animals

7.6.1 Greater or lesser extents?

7.6.2 Anthropocentrism?

8 Working Memory, Vagueness, and Consciousness

8.1 Consciousness and working memory: An old debate

8.2 The masking paradigm: A case of unconscious working memory?.

8.3 Natural kinds and vagueness

8.4 The masking paradigm: Three interpretations

8.5 Reasons to prefer the vagueness view

8.6 The attentional blink

8.7 Temporal ordering

8.8 An unstable cluster?

8.9 Consequences

8.A Appendix: Vagueness and natural kinds

8.A.1 Supervaluationism

8.A.2 Epistemicism

8.A.3 Metaphysical vagueness

9 The First Light: Natural Kinds and Baby Consciousness

9.1 Never work with children or animals

9.2 Infants and natural kinds

9.3 Are markers behavioural or neuroscientific?

9.4 Contrast with the theory-first approach

9.5 Questions concerning step one

9.6 New measures

9.7 Weak and strong correlations

9.8 Gradual emergence?

9.9 Conclusion: Cautious optimism

10 Infant Consciousness: When Does It Arise?

10.1 Two clusters?

10.2 Problems for the early markers?

10.2.1 Endogenous attention

10.2.2 The McGurk effect

10.2.3 The default mode network

10.2.4 Global oddballs

10.3 Pain

10.4 Problems for the late markers?

10.5 How natural kinds can help

10.6 Two natural kinds?

10.6.1 How could we know?

10.6.2 What would we do?

10.7 Natural kinds: Useful philosophy

References

Index.

8.2 The masking paradigm: A case of unconscious working memory?

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (Oxford Academic, viewed on August 19, 2026).

Other Format:

Print version : Taylor, Henry. Natural kinds and the science of perception.

ISBN:

9780198995043

0198995040

OCLC:

1579771186

Publisher Number:

CIPO000368639

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license