Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Hughes, Nick.

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource (585 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2026.

Summary:

This volume explores epistemic dilemmas, situations in which every available option is epistemically unacceptable. A distinguished line-up of contributors address questions regarding their existence, their nature, and the contexts in which they might arise.

Contents:

Cover

Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas

Copyright

Contents

List of Contributors

Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide

1. Introduction

2. Kinds of Epistemic Dilemmas

2.1 Higher-Order Conflicts

2.2 Factive Norm Versus Non-factive Norm Conflicts

2.3 Substantive Norm Versus Structural Norm Conflicts

2.4 Stereotyping Conflicts

2.5 Suspension Dilemmas

2.6 Reflexive Dilemmas

2.7 Cross-Domain Conflicts

2.8 Other Epistemic Conflicts and Dilemmas

3. Objections to Dilemmic Views

3.1 The No Angst Objection

3.2 Dilemmas and Deontic Logic

3.3 The Guidance Objection

3.4 The Ought-Implies-Can Objection

3.5 The Residue Objection

3.6 The Value-of-Rationality Objection

3.7 The 'No Positive Epistemic Duties' Objection

3.8 The Last Resort Objection

4. Summaries of Chapters

References

1: On the Very Idea of an Epistemic Dilemma

2. Three Grades of Dilemma

3. Are Grade Three Dilemmas Coherent?

4. Epistemic Residue

4.1 Epistemic Residue as Moral Residue

4.2 Distinctively Epistemic Residue

5. Recent Work on Epistemic Dilemmas

5.1 Rational Ideals

5.2 Knowledge Norms and Dilemmas

6. Conclusions

2: Epistemic Dilemmas Defended

2. Dilemmism

3. Greco's Anti-Dilemmas Argument

3.1 Epistemic Blame

3.2 The Reflection Argument

4. Why the Reflection Argument Doesn't Work

4.1 Blame and Quasi-Blame

4.2 Overgeneration

4.3 Inscrutable Cognizers

5. Beyond the Reflection Argument

5.1 Cognitive Penetration

5.2 knowledge / rationality Conflicts

6. rationality Without knowledge ?

6.1 The Explanatory Problem

6.2 A Solution to the Explanatory Problem?

6.3 Problems with this View

7. Other Approaches

7.1 Permissivism

7.2 The Weighing Approach

7.3 The Excuses Approach

7.4 The Dividing Approach.

8. Summing up

3: Dilemmas as Conflicts Between Values

Introduction

1. Dilemmas and Conflicting Values

2. Dilemmas as Conflicting 'Oughts'?

3. How Values Differ from Each Other

4. Innocuous Versus Threatening Dilemmas

5. Resoluble Dilemmas

6. Irresoluble Dilemmas

4: Doxastic Dilemmas and the Method of Division

1. Doxastic Dilemmas

1.1 Responses

2. The Method of Division

2.1 Explaining the Subjective Ought

2.2 Retaining an Objective Ought

2.3 What We (Subjectively/Objectively) Ought to Believe

3. Divisions, Not Dilemmas

3.1 On Suspension

3.2 Comparing Explanatory Virtues

4. Conclusion

5: Epistemological Ambivalence

2. Primitive Dilemmas

3. Cognitive Systems and Communication Systems

4. Ambivalence

5. Local-Local Epistemic Dilemmas

6. Morals

6: Beginning in Wonder: Suspensive Attitudes and Epistemic Dilemmas

2. The Case for Dilemmas: Some Underlying Assumptions and an Optimistic Hypothesis

2.1 From Simple Higher-Order Evidence to Dilemmas

2.2 The Epistemic Oracle Strikes

3. The Varieties of Epistemic Neutrality and the Avoidance of Dilemmas

3.1 Distinctions: Closed Neutrality, Open Neutrality, and the Act of Withholding

3.2 Reasons for Suspension and the Scope of Discretion

4. Against Dilemmas from Higher-Order Evidence and Coherence Requirements

4.1 How Direct Reasons for Suspension Dissolve the Simple First-Order Evidence/Higher-Order Evidence Dilemmas

4.2 How the Distinction Between Forms of Suspension Defeats the Oracle

5. Concluding Remarks

7: The Unity of Evidence and Coherence

2. A Puzzle About Evidence and Coherence

3. Bifurcationist Solutions

3.1 Epistemic Dilemmas.

3.2 Prima Facie Requirements

3.3 Rational Indeterminacy

3.4 Equivocation

4. Problems for Bifurcationism

4.1 No Distinction

4.2 The Value of Coherence

4.3 Occam's Razor

5. The Unificationist Solution

6. Ideal and Non-ideal Rationality

7. Epistemic Dilemmas Revisited

8: Evidence-Coherence Conflicts Revisited

1. A Slightly More Precise Fix on Substantive Rationality

2. How Substantive-Structural Conflicts Strengthen the Case for Dualism

3. "Epistemic Dilemmas"

4. Preface Cases

5. Misleading Higher-Order Evidence Cases

6. How to Respond to Evidence-Coherence Conflicts: Misleading Higher-Order Evidence Cases

6.1 The Argument from Unknowability of One's Predicament

6.2 The Argument from the Impossibility of Ex Post Rationality

6.3 Why Only an Excuse?

7. Why This Doesn't Work for Preface Cases

8. Conclusion

9: Embracing Incoherence

1. The Conflicting Demands of Rationality

2. Coherence Is Overrated

3. Incoherence is Underrated

3.1 Signals

3.2 Epistemic Goods

3.3 Normative Deliberation

4. Accommodating Conflict

4.1 Making Exceptions

4.2 Division

4.3 Dilemmism and Incoherentism

5. Incoherentism

6. Conclusion

10: Epistemic Ideals, a Dilemma, and Stable Evidential Support

2. The No-Paradise Dilemma

2.1 Evidentialism, Propositional, and Doxastic Rationality

2.2 Logical Equivalence

2.3 No Belief in Moore-Paradoxical Propositions

2.4 Your Total Evidence

2.5 The Dilemma

3. A Resolution

3.1 Revising Bridge

3.2 My Specification of the Stability Account of Evidentialism

3.3 Rejecting Logical Equivalence

3.4 Keeping No Moore-Paradoxical Belief

3.5 Avoiding the No-Paradise Dilemma

11: Defending the Enkratic Requirement.

1. Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Akrasia

2. Epistemic Akrasia and Believing Something on the Basis of Evidence

3. Epistemic Enkrasia and Permissible Beliefs

4. Outlook

12: Pragmatism, Evidentialism, and Dilemmas

2. The Dilemma Argument Against Strict Evidentialism

3. Homogeneous Conflicts

3.1 Parfit on Rational Irrationality

3.2 Practical and Moral Cases

4. Residual Dissatisfaction?

5. Revising the Dilemma Argument

13: Can Commitment Pose a Rational Dilemma?

1. Does Rationality Demand that Amyra Resolve to Stop Taking Opioids?

2. Does Rationality Demand that Amyra Believe that She Will Probably Not Stop Taking Opioids?

3. If Rationality Demands Each of Two Things, Does it Also Demand Both of Them?

4. Can Rationality Simultaneously Demand that Amyra Both Resolve to Stop Taking Opioids and Believe that She Will Probably Not Stop Taking Opioids?

5. The Varieties of Belief-Like Attitude

6. Objections and Replies

7. Conclusion: Applying the Present Proposal to Resolving the PAC

14: Dilemmas in Science Communication

2. Public Scientific Testimony

3. Dilemmas for Science Reporters

3.1 The Dilemma from Balanced Reporting

3.2 Solution Strategies

3.3 Residual Dilemmas from Epistemically Balanced Reporting

3.4 Concluding Remarks on the Dilemmas from Balanced Reporting

4. Dilemmas for Scientific Expert Testifiers

4.1 Characterizing Expert Trespassing Testimony

4.2 Some Problems with, and a Dilemma from, Expert Trespassing Testimony

4.3 Residual Dilemmas from Scientific Expert Trespassing Testimony

4.4 Concluding Remarks on the Dilemmas of Scientific Expert Trespassing Testimony

5. Underlying Similarities and Specific Differences

5.1 Differences and Similarities Between the Dilemmas.

5.2 A Unified Resolution Strategy

5.3 The Quest for General Principles in a Contextualized Landscape

6. Concluding Perspectives

15: Probabilistic Prejudice: On Moral Encroachment and Normative Conflicts for Graded Belief

1. Prejudice and Its Varieties

1.1 Prejudice in General

1.2 Two Kinds of Prejudice

2. The Paradox of Prejudice for Definitive Belief

2.1 Why Definitive Prejudice Is Never Rationally Required

2.2 The Revised Paradox of Prejudice

3. Two Routes to Probabilistic Prejudice

4. Probabilistic Prejudice from Direct Inference

4.1 Direct Inference Concerning Randomly Selected Individuals

4.2 Direct Inference Without Objective Chances

4.3 Direct Inference Without Proportionality

4.4 Direct Inference in the Real World

5. Probabilistic Prejudice from Predictive Inference

5.1 Predictive Inference Concerning Randomly Selected Individuals

5.2 Predictive Inference Without Randomness

5.3 Predictive Inference Without Proportionality

5.4 Predictive Inference in the Real World

6. Where Does This Leave Us?

16: Epistemic Dilemmas, Undermining Scenarios and Determinate Recommendations

2. Recommendations

3. Indeterminacy

3.1 Indeterminate Credences

3.2 The Rationality Constraints on One's Indeterminate Credences

3.3 A Stronger Constraint that We Do Not Adopt

4. Applying this Account

4.1 Extremal Bad Navigator and Evidence

4.2 Extremal Promotion and Chance

4.3 Credal Liar

4.4 Leap

4.5 Normal Cases

4.6 Promotion

4.7 Imps and Bribes

4.8 Basketball

5. A Challenge: The Spring Case

6. The Revenge Challenge: The Archer Case

7. Conclusion

17: Where is the Clutter Avoidance Dilemma?

1. Clutter Avoidance and the Belief-Level Dilemma

1.1 Cognitive Resources.

1.2 Clutter as Junk Beliefs.

Notes:

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

ISBN:

0-19-258533-9

9780192585332

OCLC:

1579622317