How to be a presentist Mark Balaguer

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Balaguer, Mark, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Presentism (Philosophy).

Physical Description:

1 online resource

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

New York, NY Oxford University Press [2026]

Summary:

Presentism is the view that only present objects exist and that there are no past or future objects. In 'How to Be a Presentist', Mark Balaguer defends presentism against numerous objections, most notably, the ontological-commitment objection, the truthmaking objection, and the special-relativity objection

Contents:

Cover

Half Title

Title Page

Copyright Page

Dedication

Contents

Acknowledgments

1 Introduction

1.1. OPENING REMARKS

1.2. PRESENTISM AND ETERNALISM

1.3. GROWING BLOCK THEORY

1.4. THE A-THEORY, ENDURANTISM, AND NON-REDUCTIONISM ABOUT TENSE

1.4.1. The A-Theory, the B-theory, and the Moving Spotlight

1.4.2. Non-Reductionism About Tense

1.4.3. Endurantism

1.5. ONTOLOGICAL PARSIMONY AS THE ONLY MOTIVATION FOR DEFENDING PRESENTISM

1.6. A LIST OF OBJECTIONS TO PRESENTISM

1.7. A SYNOPSIS OF THIS BOOK

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapters 6-8

Chapter 9

Chapter 10

Chapter 11

1.8. THE VERSION OF PRESENTISM DEVELOPED IN THIS BOOK AND METAPHYSICAL LEANNESS

1.9. WHAT I SAY HERE ISN'T REALLY TRUE

PART I METAPHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES

2 Against Trivialism

2.1. OPENING REMARKS

2.2. TRIVIALISM DEFINED

2.3. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST TRIVIALISM (IN OUTLINE)

2.4. PREMISE [2a]

2.5. PREMISE [2b]

3 Against Necessitarianism

3.1. OPENING REMARKS

3.2. PRELIMINARIES

3.2.1. Necessitarianism and Contingentism Defined

3.2.2. Conceivability, Non-Contradictoriness, and Possibility

3.2.3. Necessitarianism About Ontological Questions

3.3. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST NECESSITARIANISM (IN OUTLINE)

3.4. THE ARGUMENT FOR [3c]

3.5. CONDITIONAL NECESSITARIANISM

3.6. METAPHYSICAL NECESSITY

3.7. CONCLUSION

4 Anti-Metaphysicalism

4.1. OPENING REMARKS

4.2. SCIENTISM, NON-FACTUALISM, AND ANTI-METAPHYSICALISM

4.2.1. Scientism-or-Bust Defined

4.2.2. How Non-Factualism Could Be True

4.2.3. Anti-Metaphysicalism

4.3. THE ARGUMENT FOR SCIENTISM-OR-BUST (IN OUTLINE)

4.4. THE ARGUMENT FOR [AM4]: FROM CONTINGENTISM TO SCIENTISM

4.5. SCIENTISM VS. NON-FACTUALISM

PART II IN DEFENSE OF PRESENTISM

5 FAPP-ist Error Theory

5.1. OPENING REMARKS

5.2. ONTOLOGICAL-COMMITMENT ARGUMENTS AND THE TWO POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO THEM

5.2.1. Ontological-Commitment Arguments Against Presentism

5.2.2. Two Possible Responses

5.2.3. An Aside on Why These Sentences Really Do Involve Ontological Commitments

5.3. ONTOLOGICAL-COMMITMENT ARGUMENTS AREN'T EVEN OF THE RIGHT KIND

5.4. ERROR THEORY ABOUT [W]?

5.4.1. Error Theory About [W]? Defined

5.4.2. The Objective-Fact Objection to Error Theory About [W]?

5.4.3. FAPP-truth

5.4.4. FAPP-ism About [W]?

5.4.5. Distinguishing FAPP-ist Error Theory from Two Other Views

5.4.6. The Argument for FAPP-ism About [W]?

5.4.7. Error Theory About [W]? as a Plausible View

5.5. GENERALIZING

5.5.1. The Same Goes for Other Sentences About the Past and Future

5.5.2. Two Attractive Features of the Generality of My Argument

5.6. THE SINGULAR-PROPOSITION ARGUMENT AND THE STATUE-LUMP ARGUMENT

5.6.1. The Singular-Proposition Argument

5.6.2. The Statue-Lump Argument

6 Truthmaking I: Backing Presentists into a Nothingist Corner

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on April 7, 2026)

Other Format:

Print version :

ISBN:

9780197845745

0197845746

OCLC:

1583402059

Publisher Number:

CIPO000374007

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license