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Extreme Equilibria: The Benefits of Correlation / Kirill Rudov, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Leeat Yariv.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Rudov, Kirill.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w35170.
- NBER working paper series no. w35170
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2026.
- Summary:
- Correlated equilibria arise naturally when agents communicate or rely on intermediaries such as recommendation systems. We study when a given Nash equilibrium can be improved within the set of correlated equilibria for general objectives. Our key insight is a detail-free criterion: any Nash equilibrium with three or more randomizing agents is generically improvable. We refine this insight to specific classes of games and objectives, including Pareto and utilitarian welfare, and provide constructive methods to obtain improvements. Our findings underscore the ubiquity of improvable Nash equilibria and the crucial role of correlation in enhancing strategic outcomes.
- Notes:
- May 2026.
- Print version record
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