Opt In? Opt Out? / Alex Chan, Ayush Gupta, Yetong Xu.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Chan, Alex.

Contributor:

Gupta, Ayush.

Xu, Yetong.

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w35169.

NBER working paper series no. w35169

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2026.

Summary:

Cadaveric organ shortages leave thousands without life-saving transplants each year. Countries differ in using opt-in (informed consent) or opt-out (presumed consent) systems for donor registration. Using newly assembled cross-country panel data and an event-study design, this paper provides evidence that presumed-consent laws increase organ donation only when strictly enforced and family veto power is limited; weak opt-out regimes show negligible or even negative effects. A theoretical signaling model provides a plausible mechanism when opt-in or opt-out yields more donations, emphasizing the roles of donation propensity, signaling costs, and the family's ability to overturn defaults. A large laboratory experiment further tests these mechanisms, showing that opt-in generally produces equal or higher donation rates unless signaling is costly and family veto power is minimal. The results underscore that defaults alone rarely increase donations unless paired with strong institutional enforcement.

Notes:

May 2026.

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