Moral Conviction and Moral Uncertainty.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Bunkenborg, Francesca.

Series:

Ideen and Argumente Series

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Ethics.

Uncertainty.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (262 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Berlin/Boston : Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2025.

Summary:

This book introduces a novel challenge at the intersection of normative ethics, moral psychology and moral epistemology and develops a solution to it that has important implications for moral epistemology generally.

Contents:

Frontmatter

Title Page

Copyright

Contents

Acknowledgements

Chapter 1 The Trilemma

1.1 Moral Conviction

1.2 Moral Uncertainty

1.3 The Trilemma

1.4 Objections and Clarifications

1.5 Chapter Overview

Chapter 2 Normative Compatibility

2.1 Historical Precedent for Normative Compatibility

2.2 Arguments for Normative Compatibility

2.2.1 A Direct Argument

2.2.2 Compatibility with Other Positions in Metanormative Theory

2.3 Objections to Normative Compatibility

2.3.1 Intending Difficult Actions

2.3.2 Modesty

2.3.3 Friendship

2.4 Conclusion

Chapter 3 Moral Necessity

3.1 The Moral Necessity Account

3.1.1 Williams on Moral Incapacity and Moral Necessity

3.1.2 Frankfurt on Volitional Necessity and the Unthinkable

3.2 Non-doxastic Moral Conviction as Moral Necessity

3.3 Against Williams' Horizontal Model

3.4 Modifying Frankfurt's Hierarchical Account

3.5 The Modified Hierarchical Account and Doxastic Moral Certainty

3.6 Conclusion

Chapter 4 Commitment, Certainty, and Fanaticism

4.1 The Voluntary Commitment Account

4.2 Fundamental Commitment and the Ideal Moral Response

4.2.1 Fundamental Commitment as a Necessary Part of the Ideal Moral Response

4.2.2 Fundamental Commitment and Doxastic Moral Certainty

4.3 The Fanaticism Charge

4.3.1 Three Fanaticism Charges Against Doxastic Moral Certainty

4.3.2 Three Fanaticism Charges Against Fundamental Moral Commitment

4.4 Conclusion

Chapter 5 Justified Moral Certainty

5.1 Certainty and its Relation to Belief and Knowledge

5.2 Infallibly Justified Certainty and the Modal Status of Moral Heroes' Relevant Moral Views

5.3 Infallibilist Certainty: First Pass

5.4 Infallibilist Certainty: Externalism to the Rescue?

5.4.1 Factive Externalism About Grounds of Justification.

5.4.2 Why be a Factive Externalist?

5.5 Fallibilist Certainty

5.5.1 The Strength of Moral Heroes' Relevant Moral Seemings

5.5.2 Two Accounts of Fallibly Justified Certainty

5.5.3 Further Objections

5.6 Conclusion

Chapter 6 Defeaters

6.1 Realist Rebuttals

6.2 The Naiveté Approach

6.3 Defeat Scepticism

6.4 Higher-Order Considerations and Level-Splitting

6.4.1 Against Level-Splitting

6.4.2 Why Level-Splitting Will Not Solve the Trilemma

6.5 Conclusion

Chapter 7 Solving the Trilemma

7.1 Steadfastness and Self-Trust

7.2 Practical Encroachment on Epistemic Status

7.3 Morally Disabled Defeaters

7.4 Why Accept Morally Disabled Defeaters?

7.5 Advantages of the Account

7.6 Conclusion: Solving the Trilemma

References

Index Nominum

Index Rerum.

Notes:

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Part of the metadata in this record was created by AI, based on the text of the resource.

ISBN:

3-11-220601-0

OCLC:

1546522044