Brain-Computer Interfaces and the Philosophy of Mind and Action.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Drosselmeier, Sebastian.

Series:

Epistemic Studies

Epistemic Studies ; v.54

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Brain-computer interfaces.

Philosophy of mind.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (202 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Berlin/Boston : Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2025.

Summary:

How can brain-computer interfaces enhance our understanding of human agency and mentality?By exploring how these interfaces enable people to perform intentional actions seemingly merely with their thoughts, Drosselmeier delves into three core metaphysical issues in the philosophy of mind: agency, mental causation, and the mind-brain relationship.

Contents:

Acknowledgements

Contents

Introduction

1 The mind-body problem in brain-computer interfaces

2 A brief introduction into the neuroscience of brain-computer interfaces

3 The basic idea

4 Overview of the book

Chapter 1 From Common-Sense Psychology to Neuroscience and Back

1.1 Preliminaries

1.2 Dennett‏'‎s three stances

1.2.1 The physical stance and the design stance

1.2.2 The intentional stance and intentional states

1.3 All a matter of interpretation?

1.3.1 Validation, ontology, demarcation

1.3.2 Realism, mild realism, and higher-level patterns

1.3.3 Continuity or autonomy?

1.3.4 Brentano‏'‎s claim

1.4 Could intentionality be reduced?

1.4.1 Intentional states as brain states

1.4.2 The language of thought and teleosemantics

1.4.3 Dennett‏'‎s reductionism and the myth of intrinsic intentionality

1.5 Conclusion: Should intentionality be eliminated?

Chapter 2 Towards a Nonreductive Naturalisation of Intentionality

2.1 Preliminaries

2.2 Sellars' clash between the manifest and the scientific image

2.2.1 What are the two images?

2.2.2 The Sellarsian dictum of the primacy of the scientific image

2.2.3 The paradox of thought

2.2.4 The (mild) explanatory primacy of the scientific image

2.3 Stereoscopic vision

2.3.1 Ground rules

2.3.2 Basic minds without content

2.3.3 Social minds with content

2.3.4 Socially derived intentionality

2.4 Conclusion: Autonomy and continuity

Chapter 3 Agency and Mental Causation in Brain-Computer Interfaces

3.1 Preliminaries

3.2 Agency and causation

3.2.1 BCI Bob and Standard Sam

3.2.2 Are reasons causes?

3.2.3 Anomalous monism and higher-level causalism

3.2.4 Skills and interpretation

3.3 Mental and neural causation

3.3.1 The causal exclusion problem

3.3.2 Interventionist causation.

3.3.3 Why multiple realisability is not enough

3.3.4 Physicalism, supervenience, and variable competition

3.4 Conclusion: Agency and higher-level causes

Conclusion

References

Index.

Notes:

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Part of the metadata in this record was created by AI, based on the text of the resource.

ISBN:

3-11-169200-0

OCLC:

1525278480