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Labor Supply of Politicians / Raymond Fisman, Nikolaj A. Harmon, Emir Kamenica, Inger Munk.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Fisman, Raymond.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w17726.
- NBER working paper series no. w17726
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2012.
- Summary:
- We examine the labor supply of politicians using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). We exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries, which had previously differed by as much as a factor of ten. Doubling an MEP's salary increases the probability of running for reelection by 23 percentage points and increases the logarithm of the number of parties that field a candidate by 29 percent of a standard deviation. A salary increase has no discernible impact on absenteeism or shirking from legislative sessions; in contrast, non-pecuniary motives, proxied by home-country corruption, substantially impact the intensive margin of labor supply. Finally, an increase in salary lowers the quality of elected MEPs, measured by the selectivity of their undergraduate institutions.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- January 2012.
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