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The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective / William M. Landes, Richard A. Posner.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Landes, William M.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w0110.
- NBER working paper series no. w0110
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Judicial power.
- Separation of powers.
- Judicial review.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1975.
- Cambridge, Massachusetts : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975.
- Summary:
- We believe that at a deeper level the independent judiciary is not only consistent with, but essential to, the interest-group theory of government. Part I of this paper explains our theory of the independent judiciary. Part II discusses several implications of the theory, relating to administrative regulation, the form of interest-group legislation, the tenure of judges, and constitutional adjudication. The appendix to this paper presents an empirical analysis of judicial independence using data on Acts of Congress that have been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- October 1975.
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