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A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlements and Litigation Costs / A. Mitchell Polinsky, Daniel L. Rubinfeld.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Polinsky, A. Mitchell.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w2114.
- NBER working paper series no. w2114
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Compromise (Law).
- Actions and defenses.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1986.
- Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1986.
- Summary:
- This note reexamines the theory of optimal public enforcement when litigation costs are incurred if the defendant is prosecuted at trial, and when an out-of-court settlement is possible. Using a numerical example, it is shown that settlements and litigation costs can substantially alter the optimal system of public enforcement. It is also shown that failing to take these considerations into account can significantly lower the achievable level of social welfare.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- December 1986.
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