The ARRA: Some Unpleasant Welfare Arithmetic / Casey B. Mulligan.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Mulligan, Casey B.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w18591.

NBER working paper series no. w18591

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2012.

Summary:

Distributions of tax rates on job acceptance and layoff margins are estimated for unemployed household heads and spouses under three benefit and tax rule scenarios: actual rules under the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, rules as they would have been if they had not been changed since 2007, and rules as they might have been with a bigger fiscal stimulus. Two or three million unemployed household heads and spouses, with a variety of tax situations, had as much disposable income while unemployed as they would have by accepting a job that paid 80-100 percent of their previous one. The number would have been less than one million under 2007 rules, and about nine million under a bigger stimulus. Tax obligations and foregone unemployment insurance about equally erode the rewards from retaining a job, or starting a new one.

Notes:

Print version record

December 2012.