1 option
Misconduct in Credence Good Markets / Jennifer Brown, Dylan B. Minor.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Brown, Jennifer.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w18608.
- NBER working paper series no. w18608
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2012.
- Summary:
- We examine misconduct in credence good markets with price taking experts. We propose a market-level model in which price-taking experts extract surplus based on the value of their firm's brand and their own skill. We test the predictions of the model using sales complaint data for exclusive and independent insurance agents. We find that exclusive insurance agents working for large branded firms are more likely to be the subject of a justified sales complaint, relative to independent experts, despite doing substantially less business. In addition, more experienced experts attract more complaints per year.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- December 2012.
The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.