Capital Allocation in Mult-Division Firms: Hurdle Rates vs. Budgets / Robert A. Taggart, Jr..

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Taggart, Robert A, Jr.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w1213.

NBER working paper series no. w1213

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Capital Allocation in Mult-Division Firms

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1983.

Summary:

It is common practice for firms to ration capital funds to their divisions, rather than set a price and let the divisions use as much as they want. This appears to be true even when the overall firm faces no rationing in the capital market. This paper offers an interpretation of this phenomenon based on Martin Weitzman's "Prices vs. Quantities" model. It is found that a rationing systemis advantageous when division managers do not perceive the full consequences of their investment decisions for the firm as a whole. By contrast, a pricing system for allocating capital among divisions would be favored when the division managers possess valuable information that cannot be costlessly communicated to headquarters. It is then argued that actual capital budgeting practice in many firms reflects a mixture of these two systems and can thus be interpreted as an attempt to reap both kinds of benefits at once.

Notes:

Print version record

October 1983.