Fraud in the Workplace? Evidence from a Dependent Verification Program / Michael Geruso, Harvey S. Rosen.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Geruso, Michael.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Rosen, Harvey S.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w18947.

NBER working paper series no. w18947

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2013.

Summary:

Many employers have implemented dependent verification (DV) programs, which aim to reduce employee benefits costs by ensuring that ineligible persons are not enrolled in their health plan as dependents. We evaluate a DV program using a panel of health plan enrollment data from a large, single-site employer. We find that dependents were 2.7 percentage points less likely to be reenrolled in the year that DV was introduced, indicating that this fraction of dependents was ineligibly enrolled prior to the program's introduction. We show that these dependents were actually ineligible, rather than merely discouraged from re-enrollment by compliance costs.

Notes:

Print version record

April 2013.