OSHA Enforcement, Industrial Compliance and Workplace Injuries / Ann P. Bartel, Lacy Glenn Thomas.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Bartel, Ann P.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Glenn Thomas, Lacy.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w0953.

NBER working paper series no. w0953

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1982.

Summary:

This paper develops and tests a three-equation simultaneous model of OSHA enforcement behavior, industrial compliance and workplace injuries. The enforcement equation is based on the assumption that OSHA acts as a political institution that gains support through the transfer of wealth from firms to employees; the empirical results are largely consistent with this notion. Contrary to previous work, we find that OSHA enforcement efforts have, indeed, had a statistically significant impact on industrial compliance and, further, that this compliance has led to a statistically significant decrease in worker injuries. The point estimate of the elasticity of the lost workday rate with respect to the OSHA inspection rate is -.04.

Notes:

Print version record

August 1982.