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Misperceptions, Moral Hazard, and Incentives in Groups / Martin Gaynor.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Gaynor, Martin.
- Series:
- Technical Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. t0035.
- NBER technical working paper series no. t0035
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1987.
- Summary:
- Recent work has shown that, in the presence of moral hazard, balanced budget Nash equilibria in groups are not pareto-optimal. This work shows that when agents misperceive the effects of their actions on the joint outcome, there exist a set of sharing rules which balance the budget and lead to a pareto-optimal Nash equilibria.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- May 1987.
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