On the Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules / A. Mitchell Polinsky.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Polinsky, A. Mitchell.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w0286.

NBER working paper series no. w0286

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Property.

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1978.

Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978.

Summary:

When parties can bargain with each other in an externality situation, it is frequently argued that liability rules are preferable to property rules. The case for liability rules is thought to be strongest when the parties behave strategically, when the collective authority responsible for maximizing social welfare has perfect information, and when lump-sum transfers are not available. It is shown here that liability rules are not generally preferable to property rules in these circumstances because of their limited ability to redistribute income between the parties.

Notes:

Print version record

October 1978.