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Hospital Cost and Efficiency Under Per Service and Per Case Payment in Maryland: A Tale of the Carrot and the Stick / David S. Salkever, Donald M. Steinwachs, Agnes Rupp.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Salkever, David S.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w1633.
- NBER working paper series no. w1633
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Other Title:
- Hospital Cost and Efficiency Under Per Service and Per Case Payment in Maryland
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1985.
- Summary:
- The simultaneous operation of per case and per servicepayment systems in Maryland, and the varying levels of stringency used in setting per case rates allows comparison of effects of differing incentive structures on hospital costs. This paper presents such a comparison with 1977-1981 data. Cost per case and total cost regressions show evidence of lower costs only when per case payment limits are very stringent. Positive net revenue incentives appear insufficient to induce reductions in length of stay and in ancillary services use. Our results suggest these changes in medical practice patterns are more likely under the threat of financial losses.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- June 1985.
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