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"Nash-in-Nash" Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work / Allan Collard-Wexler, Gautam Gowrisankaran, Robin S. Lee.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Collard-Wexler, Allan.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w20641.
- NBER working paper series no. w20641
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Other Title:
- “Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2014.
- Summary:
- A "Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains" has become a workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly. This paper proposes a non-cooperative foundation for "Nash-in-Nash" bargaining that extends the Rubinstein (1982) alternating offers model to multiple upstream and downstream firms. We provide conditions on firms' marginal contributions under which there exists, for sufficiently short time between offers, an equilibrium with agreement among all firms at prices arbitrarily close to "Nash-in-Nash prices"--i.e., each pair's Nash bargaining solution given agreement by all other pairs. Conditioning on equilibria without delayed agreement, limiting prices are unique. Unconditionally, they are unique under stronger assumptions.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- October 2014.
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