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Sustainable Shadow Banking / Guillermo Ordonez.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Ordonez, Guillermo.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w19022.
- NBER working paper series no. w19022
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2013.
- Summary:
- Commercial banks are subject to regulation that restricts their investments. When banks are concerned for their reputation, however, they could self-regulate and invest more efficiently. Hence, a shadow banking that arises to avoid regulation has the potential to improve welfare. Still, reputation concerns depend on future economic prospects and may suddenly disappear, generating a collapse of shadow banking and a return to traditional banking, with a decline in welfare. I discuss how a combination of traditional regulation and cross reputation subsidization may enhance shadow banking and make it more sustainable.
- Notes:
- May 2013.
- Print version record
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