Randomness in Tax Enforcement / Suzanne Scotchmer, Joel Slemrod.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Scotchmer, Suzanne.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Slemrod, Joel.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w2512.

NBER working paper series no. w2512

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1988.

Summary:

For most parameter values, increased randomness about how much taxable income an auditor would assess leads to higher reported income and more revenue, When reducing randomness is costly, optimality requires some randomness in assessed taxable Income. Even if reducing randomness g costless, taxpayers may prefer some randomness when the increased revenue can be rebated, so that the government a revenue stays fixed. These results do not rely on the presence of a distortion in labor supply.

Notes:

Print version record

February 1988.