Quotas and the Stability of Implicit Collusion / Julio J. Rotemberg, Garth Saloner.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Rotemberg, Julio J.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Saloner, Garth.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w1948.

NBER working paper series no. w1948

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Import quotas--Mathematical models.

Import quotas.

Competition.

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1986.

Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1986.

Summary:

This paper shows that the imposition of an import quota by one country

can lead to increased competitiveness; protection can reduce the price in the

country that imposes the quota, the foreign country, or both. This emerges

from a model in which the firms are assumed to sustain collusion by the threat

of reversion to more competitive pricing. We consider both prices and

quantities as the strategic variables and study competition both in the

domestic and the foreign market taken individually, and in the two markets

taken together.

Notes:

Print version record

June 1986.