Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits / Timothy Besley, Anne Case.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Besley, Timothy.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Case, Anne.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w4575.

NBER working paper series no. w4575

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1993.

Summary:

This paper uses data from U.S. states to investigate whether electoral accountability affects economic policy choices. We set up a model in which the possibility of being re-elected may curtail opportunistic behavior by incumbent governors. We find that facing a binding term limit affects choices on taxes, expenditures, state minimum wages and mandates on workers' compensation. Such effects are found also to vary with the party affiliation of the incumbent. The Democratic party also appears to suffer at the polls following the term of a lame-duck, Democratic incumbent.

Notes:

Print version record

December 1993.