Rules, Discretion, and Central Bank Independence: The German Experience 1880-1989 / Bernhard Eschweiler, Michael D. Bordo.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Eschweiler, Bernhard.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Bordo, Michael D.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w4547.

NBER working paper series no. w4547

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Rules, Discretion, and Central Bank Independence

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1993.

Summary:

Theories of rules and discretion suggest that monetary policy rules are first best in terms of social welfare. However, if commitment is not feasible, delegating monetary policy to an independent and conservative central bank can be second best. Monetary policy in Germany during the past one hundred years provides an excellent case to assess the empirical evidence on the use of rules and central bank independence in monetary policy making. Since the creation of a central monetary authority in 1876, Germany has participated in four monetary regimes: the pre-war gold standard, the inter-war gold standard, the Bretton-Woods system, and the floating exchange rate regime. The bottom line of our analysis is that monetary policy in Germany was always geared toward maintaining price stability with the exception of the two world war periods. Germany relied both on rules and discretion with central bank independence to achieve the goal of price stability. A comparison of the Classical Gold Standard regime with the floating exchange rate regime suggests that society under the floating exchange rate regime with central bank independence was better off. However, this comparison ignores the historical difference in output shocks and the possibility that society became more inflation averse over time.

Notes:

Print version record

November 1993.