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Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies / Joseph E. Stiglitz, Aaron S. Edlin.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Stiglitz, Joseph E.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w4145.
- NBER working paper series no. w4145
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Other Title:
- Discouraging Rivals
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1992.
- Summary:
- We argue here for a broader view of the biases in managers' decisions: In general, managerial rent-seeking affects not only the level of investment, but also the form. Our basic hypothesis is simple: given the now well-established scope for managerial discretion, managers have an incentive to exercise that discretion to enhance their income. Any managerial contract is subject to renegotiation, and a manager's pay is the outcome of an often bewildering bargaining process between management, the board of directors, and rival management teams or takeover artists.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- August 1992.
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