Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence / Orley Ashenfelter, David E. Bloom.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Ashenfelter, Orley.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Bloom, David E.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w1149.

NBER working paper series no. w1149

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Models of Arbitrator Behavior

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1983.

Summary:

This paper analyzes and compares arbitrator behavior under conventional and final-offer arbitration. Simple models of arbitrator behavior are developed under each of these alternative mechanisms. These models are estimated and tested using data on the outcomes of both forms of arbitrationin New Jersey, a state in which arbitration is mandatory for unresolved pay disputes involving police officer unions and public employers. The major findings are (1) that the high proportion of union victories under final-offer arbitration were generated by a set of impartial arbitrators applying the same standards used in conventional arbitration, and (2) that union bargainers appear to be considerably more risk averse than employer bargainers, with the wage increases under final-offer arbitration having a lower mean and a lower variance than under conventional arbitration.

Notes:

Print version record

June 1983.