Negative Expected Value Suits / Lucian Arye Bebchuk.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w6474.

NBER working paper series no. w6474

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Costs (Law).

Actions and defenses--Econometric models.

Actions and defenses.

Compromise (Law)--Econometric models.

Compromise (Law).

Costs (Law)--Econometric models.

Judgments--Econometric models.

Judgments.

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1998.

Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998.

Summary:

When the cost of a suit exceeds the expected judgment, will a potential plaintiff be able to extract any amount in settlement from the defendant? If so, what is the source of the plaintiff's ability to extract a settlement? This essay discusses existing theories as to why (and when) plaintiffs with negative-expected-value (NEV) suits can extract a settlement amount from the defendant. Among the theories discussed are ones that focus on informational issues and ones that focus on the way in which the parties' litigation costs are expected to be distributed over time.

Notes:

Print version record

March 1998.