1 option
Implicit Contracts, Labor Mobility and Unemployment / Richard J. Arnott, Arthur Hosios, Joseph Stiglitz.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Arnott, Richard J.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w2316.
- NBER working paper series no. w2316
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Labor mobility.
- Employment (Economic theory).
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1987.
- Cambridge, Massachusetts : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1987.
- Summary:
- Firms' inability to monitor their employees' search effort forces a tradeoff between risk-bearing and incentive considerations when designing employment-related insurance. Since the provision of insurance against firm-specific shocks adversely affects workers' incentives to find better jobs, the optimal contract provides only partial insurance: it prescribes low (high) wages and under (over) employment to encourage workers to leave (stay) at low (high) productivity firms; and it employs quits and layoffs as alternative means of inducing separations at low productivity firms, with the mix depending upon the relative efficiency of the on- and off-the-job search technologies. Our analysis of implicit contracts with asymmetric search information establishes that any consistent explanation for worksharing, layoffs, severance pay, quits and unemployment must focus on questions of labor mobility.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- July 1987.
The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.