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Smuggling, Camouflaging, and Market Structure / Richard A. Jensen, Jerry Thursby, Marie Thursby.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Jensen, Richard A.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w2630.
- NBER working paper series no. w2630
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Smuggling.
- Industrial organization (Economic theory).
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1988.
- Cambridge, Massachusetts : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1988.
- Summary:
- We examine how market structure and enforcement affect smuggling and welfare in a model where smuggling is camouflaged by legal sales. Conditions are given for when some, but not necessarily all, firms smuggle. With camouflaging, the market price is below the price when all sales are legal, so smuggling improves welfare if the price effect outweighs excess smuggling cost. This welfare effect is directly related to the degree of competition. Increased enforcement in this model potentially reduces welfare. The model is shown to be consistent with evidence on cigarette smuggling in the United States for 1975-1982.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- June 1988.
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