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A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders / A. Mitchell Polinsky, Daniel L. Rubinfeld.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Polinsky, A. Mitchell.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w3739.
- NBER working paper series no. w3739
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1991.
- Summary:
- This paper analyzes optimal fines in a model in which individuals can commit up to two offenses. The fine for the second offense is allowed to differ from the fine for the first offense. There are four natural cases in the model, defined by assumptions about the gains to individuals from committing the offense. In the case fully analyzed it may be optimal to punish repeat offenders more severely than first-time offenders. In another case, it may be optimal to impose less severe penalties on repeat offenders. And in the two remaining cases, the optimal penalty does not change.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- June 1991.
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