Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior / Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kaplow, Louis.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Shavell, Steven.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w3822.

NBER working paper series no. w3822

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1991.

Summary:

Self-reporting -- the reporting by parties of their own behavior to an enforcement authority -- is a commonly observed aspect of law enforcement, as in the context of environmental and safety regulation. We add self-reporting to the model of the control of harmful externalities through probabilistic law enforcement. Optimal self-reporting schemes are characterized and are shown to offer two advantages over schemes without self-reporting: enforcement resources are saved because individuals who are led to report harmful acts need not be identified; risk is reduced because individuals bear certain sanctions when they report their behavior, rather than face uncertain sanctions.

Notes:

Print version record

August 1991.