Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the U.S. / Steven N. Kaplan.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kaplan, Steven N.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w4065.

NBER working paper series no. w4065

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Corporate profits.

Executives--Salaries, etc.

Executives.

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1992.

Cambridge, Massachusetts : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1992.

Summary:

This paper compares CEO and top management turnover and its relation to firm performance in the largest companies (by sales) in Japan and the U.S. Japanese top managers are older and have shorter tenures as top managers than their U.S. counterparts. Overall, however, turnover-performance relations are economically and statistically similar: turnover is negatively related to stock, sales, and earnings performance in both countries. Turnover in Japan is particularly sensitive to low earnings. Evidence on executive compensation confirms that Japanese executives own less stock and receive lower cash compensation than U.S. executives. Cash compensation performance relations, nevertheless, are also similar in magnitude to those found in previous work for U.S. executives.

Notes:

Print version record

May 1992.