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Cross Sectional Efficiency and Labor Hoarding in an Matching Model of Unemployment / Giuseppe Bertola, Ricardo J. Caballero.

NBER Working papers Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Bertola, Giuseppe.
Contributor:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Caballero, Ricardo J.
Series:
Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w4472.
NBER working paper series no. w4472
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1993.
Summary:
We study positive and normative aspects of steady-state equilibrium in a market where firms of endogenous size experience idiosyncratic shocks and undergo a costly search process to hire their workers. The stylized model we propose highlights interactions between job-security provisions and sectoral shocks in determining the natural rate of unemployment, the allocation of labor, and the extent of labor hoarding, and rationalizes cross-sectional asymmetries of gross employment flows at the firm level. In our model, where productivity and search costs are dynamically heterogeneous across firms, decentralized wage bargains imply important cross-sectional inefficiencies, which overshadow the static search inefficiencies on which simpler models focus.
Notes:
Print version record
September 1993.

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