Why Doesn't Society Minimize Central Bank Secrecy? / Karen K. Lewis.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Lewis, Karen K.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w3397.

NBER working paper series no. w3397

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1990.

Summary:

Societies have incentives to design institutions that allow central bank secrecy. This paper illustrates these incentives in two ways. First, if society tries to constrain secrecy in one way, central bankers will try to regain lost effectiveness by building up secrecy in other ways. Therefore, we may wind up accepting types of secrecy that appear preventable because reducing them would lead to higher costs. Second, if the social trade-offs between policy objectives change over time, the public may directly prefer greater central bank secrecy so that it will be surprised with expansionary policies when it most desires them.

Notes:

Print version record

July 1990.