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Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies / Alberto Alesina, Gerald D. Cohen, Nouriel Roubini.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Alesina, Alberto.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w3830.
- NBER working paper series no. w3830
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1991.
- Summary:
- The purpose of this paper is to test for evidence of opportunistic "political business cycles" in a large sample of 18 OECD economies. Our results can be summarized as follows: 1) We find very little evidence of pre-electoral effects of economic outcomes, in particular, on GDP growth and unemployment; 2) We see some evidence of "political monetary cycles." that is, expansionary monetary policy in election years; 3) We also observe indications of "political budget cycles," or "loose" fiscal policy prior to elections; 4) Inflation exhibits a postelectoral jump, which could be explained by either the preelectoral "loose" monetary and fiscal policies and/or by an opportunistic timing of increases in publicly controlled prices, or indirect taxes.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- September 1991.
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