Risk-Shifting by Federally Insured Commercial Banks / Armen Hovakimian, Edward J. Kane.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Hovakimian, Armen.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Kane, Edward J.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w5711.

NBER working paper series no. w5711

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1996.

Summary:

Mispriced and misadministered deposit insurance imparts risk-shifting incentives to U.S. banks. Regulators are expected to monitor and discipline increases in bank risk exposure that would transfer wealth from the FDIC to bank stockholders. This paper assesses the success regulators had in controlling risk-shifting by U.S. banks during 1985-1994. In contrast to single-equation estimates developed from the option model by others, our simultaneous-equation evidence indicates that regulators failed to prevent large U.S. banks from shifting risk to the FDIC. Moreover, at the margin, banks that are undercapitalized shifted risk more effectively than other sample banks.

Notes:

Print version record

August 1996.