Voting to Tell Others / Stefano DellaVigna, John A. List, Ulrike Malmendier, Gautam Rao.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

DellaVigna, Stefano.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

List, John A.

Malmendier, Ulrike.

Rao, Gautam.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w19832.

NBER working paper series no. w19832

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2014.

Summary:

Why do people vote? We argue that social image plays a significant role in explaining turnout: people vote because others will ask. The expectation of being asked motivates turnout if individuals derive pride from telling others that they voted, or feel shame from admitting that they did not vote, provided that lying is costly. We design a field experiment to estimate the effect of social image concerns on voting. In a door-to-door survey about election turnout, we experimentally vary (i) the informational content and use of a flyer pre-announcing the survey, (ii) the duration and payment for the survey, and (iii) the incentives to lie about past voting. Our estimates suggest significant social image concerns. For a plausible range of lying costs, we estimate the monetary value of voting `because others will ask' to be in the range of $5-$15 for the 2010 Congressional election. In a complementary get-out-the-vote experiment, we inform potential voters before the election that we will ask them later whether they voted. We find suggestive evidence that the treatment increases turnout.

Notes:

Print version record

January 2014.